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UNCERTAINTY AND UNPREDICTABILITY IN
PATENT LITIGATION: THE TIME IS RIPE FOR A
CONSISTENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
METHODOLOGY
Gretchen Ann Bender*
I. INTRODUCTION

Corporations, in-house counsel and even trial litigators require certainty
and predictability in order to develop products, businesses and litigation
strategies. Lawyers need certainty and predictability to advise their clients
of litigation risks and potential outcomes. Unfortunately, the field of patent
infringement litigation currently lacks the certainty and predictability

necessary to efficiently litigate (and resolve) cases. Trial courts currently
struggle with patent claim construction, a critical issue in any patent case.
Despite this struggle, claim construction is rarely resolved at the trial stage.
The Federal Circuit changes the trial court's claim construction in approximately forty percent of its cases.'
* Partner, Morris, James, Hitchens & Williams, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, LL.M. in Patent Law

and Intellectual Property Law from The George Washington University Law School, 2001, University
of San Francisco, J.D., 1986, Northwestern University, B.A. in History, 1982.
' See infra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
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This article will explore claim construction and analyze the deficiencies
of the current approach to claim construction. First, the article will explore
the public policies of the patent system that impact claim drafting and claim
construction issues, the statutory requirements of claim drafting and the
Federal Circuit's claim construction procedures.2 Next, the article will
demonstrate that the current practice does not provide certainty or
predictability to patent litigants. It will attempt to explain why uncertainty
is inherent in the current claim construction approach.' Finally, the author
will propose a methodology designed to reduce uncertainty and unpredictability in claim construction consistent with the public policy and general
principles of United States patent law.'
II. BACKGROUND
A. PATENT PROCESS AND POLICY

Public policy requires that a patent owner clearly and explicitly notify the
public of the scope of the subject invention. The patent document itself
should put the world on notice of the patent's boundaries.

1. The Public Policy of the United States Patent System. A patent is a
statutory right granted to an inventor or the inventor's assignee by a national
government to exclude other people from practicing the invention disclosed
or claimed in the patent." A patent grants its owner a monopoly over the
invention!
The United States patent system attempts to accommodate an inherent
ideological tension. On one hand, the inventor's productive efforts
presumably will have a positive effect on society through the introduction
of new products and manufacturing processes into the economy! Competi-

2 See infra notes 6-212 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 217-63 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 264-73 and accompanying text.
a See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,146-47,9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1847
(1989).
' See 35 U.S.C. SS 271(a), 281 (1994) (patent owner may file a civil suit for infringement against
anyone who, without authority makes, uses or sells the patented invention).
' Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (1974); see also
GLOBAL DIMENsIONs OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INSCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY 5 (Mitchel
B.Waerstein et al. eds. 1993) (stating that inadequate intellectual property right protection could result
3
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tive conditions created by our free enterprise system are presumed to be the
lifeblood of the United States economy. In addition, industrial innovation
is essential to the nation's welfare through productivity gains, economic
growth, new jobs and higher standards of living that result from technological progress." Because of the high costs of research, development and
commercialization associated with inventions, many commentators believe
that United States industry depends on the safeguards provided by the patent
laws.'" Thus, it has been strongly argued that modern industries, such as the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, could not exist without a
strong and effective patent law system.1
On the other hand, patents have a public price. Because a patent grants
the owner the ability to monopolize the production, use, and sale of the
subject matter claimed by the patent, these private monopoly rights may
reduce or eliminate competition, thereby resulting in restricted output and
higher consumer prices. 2 Moreover, imitation and refinement of the
invention are necessary to the invention itself and need to be encouraged. 3
Since its inception, the United States has attempted to balance the
tensions inherent in its patent system. The United States Constitution
empowers Congress "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries."" Thus, Article I grants Congress
the power to establish laws to encourage and reward individual effort by

in economic losses in innovating firms and thus lead to a reduction in the rate of industrial innovation in
the United States); Honorable Howard T. Markey, 7he ConstitutionalKey n.02, 11-12 in Albany Law
School, Annual Conference on Intellectual Property (1988).
' See RICHARD W.JUDY & CAROL D'AMIco, WORKFORCE 2020: WORK AND WORKERS IN THE
21ST CENTURY xii, 2,12-13,60 (1997); GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, supra note 8, at 3 (stating that we live in a world in which the economic health
of nations is determined largely by the ability "to develop, commercialize, and most importantly, to
appropriate (or capture) the economic benefits from scientific and technological (S&'I) innovations.").
" See GeraldJ. Mossinghoff & Ralph Oman, The WorldIntellectualPropertyOrganization:-A United
NationsSuccess Story, 160 WORLD AFF. 104, 105 (1997) (stating that the history of the United States is no
more accurately recorded than the vast collection of U.S. patents); C.ROBERT M. SHERWOOD,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 53 (1990) (stating that intellectual property

fosters competition and protection of intellectual property generates new ideas and new technology).
n Mossinghoff, supra note 10, at 105.
12 See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 7-10, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459 (1966)
(detailing Thomas Jefferson's aversion to monopolies); see also F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, 422, 450-51 (2d ed. 1980).
"3
14

Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 146.
U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 8.
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means of private patent monopolies. Yet, Article I also limits Congress by
requiring that patent legislation promote "the Progress of Science and useful
Arts."' The article prohibits issuance of patents which remove existing
knowledge from the public domain or restrict free access to materials already
available.16 In return for the patent monopoly, the patent laws also require
the inventor to fully disclose the invention, 7 so that upon the expiration of
the twenty year monopoly period, "the knowledge of the invention enures
to the people, who are thus enabled without restriction to practice it and
profit by its use." 8 Indeed, the Supreme Court has reminded us that patent
rights are limited.
The patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the
inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was
a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.
The grant of an exclusive right to an invention was the
creation of society-at odds with the inherent free nature of
disclosed ideas-and was not to be freely given. Only
inventions and discoveries which furthered human knowledge, and were new and useful, justified the special inducement of a limited private monopoly. 9
Thus, the United States patent system attempts to reconcile two
fundamental competing interests. It tries to provide meaningful incentives
to innovate;20 yet, it also tries to insure that patents are not used to deprive
the public and other innovators from use of that which should be in the
public domain. In order to effectively achieve this balance, both parties to
the patent system, the patentee and the public, must understand the scope of
the patent. The parties must understand what falls within the exclusive grant

" Id; see also Graham, 383 U.S. at 9 (There is a" 'line between the things which are worth to the
public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.'" (quoting correspondence of

Thomas Jefferson)).
Graham, 383 U.S. at 6.
35 U.S.C. S 112 (1994).
IS United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187, 17 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 154 (1933).
'9 Graham, 383 U.S. at 9.
See 35 U.S.C. S 200 (1994), (amended 2000) (stating that it is the policy and objective of Congress
to use patent system to promote utilization of inventions); Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218,241-42
(1832) (stating that a patent "is the reward stipulated for the advantages derived by the public for the
exertions of the individual, and is intended as a stimulus to those exertions").
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of the patent and what has been dedicated to the public. Indeed, this is the
basic purpose of the patent document.
2. Overview of the Patent Prosecution Process. The United States
authorizes patents for new, unobvious and useful inventions." To obtain a
patent, an inventor must timely file an application with the United States
Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO").22 The PTO assigns each application
to an examiner trained in the relevant technology. The examiner then
conducts a search of the prior art23 and determines whether the applicant's
invention complies with the legal requirements of patentability. 4 If the
examiner allows the claims, the PTO will issue a patent.2 Patent protection
lasts twenty years from the date on which the application was filed.26 Once
the patent is issued, it is presumed to be valid."
The basic written structure of a patent contains two elements: the
specification and the claims which are technically part of the specification.
The specification must contain a written description of the invention and of
the manner and process of making and using it in such full, clear, concise and
exact terms so as to enable any person skilled in the art of the invention to
make and use the invention.29 The specification also sets forth the best mode
of carrying out the invention contemplated by the inventor."
The
specification then concludes with one or more claims that particularly point
out and distinctly claim the subject matter that the applicant regards as his
invention. 3

2

35 U.S.C.

SS

101, 103 (1994).

35 U.S.C. S 111(a) (1994).
Prior art constitutes those references which may be used to determine novelty and unobviousness
of claimed subject matter in a patent application or patent. A reference must be in the art pertinent to the
invention in question or in an analogous art. DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS GI-18 (1999).
24 Id at OV-1.
25 See 35 U.S.C. SS 151, 153 (1994) (providing conditions and methods of issuing patents).
26 35 U.S.C. S 154(a)(2) (1994). Formerly patents extended for seventeen years from the date the
patent issued. However, as a result of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, patents now endure twenty
years from the date the application was filed. MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., PATENT LAW 1191
(unpublished version Fall 1997) (on file with author).
2

35 U.S.C. S 282 (1994).

35 U.S.C. $ 112 (1994); 37 C.F.R. SS 1.71, 1.75 (1999). The statutory requirements are discussed
more specifically below. See infra notes 75-100.
35 U.S.C. S 112 (1994).
0 Id
31 Id
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When a patent issues, the specification and drawings filed with the
application are printed and distributed as part of the issued patent. 2 The
claims, specification and PTO file history constitute the public record of the
patentee's claim." Competitors are entitled to review the public record,
apply established rules of claim construction, ascertain the scope of the
patentee's claimed invention and use this information to design around the
claimed invention.3 4 In addition, full disclosure of the invention promotes
the progress of science and useful arts by eventually giving the public at large
a right to make, construct, use and render the thing invented." Thus, the
patent is a deed which sets out the metes and bounds of the intellectual
property the inventor owns for the term and puts the world on notice either
to avoid trespass or to purchase all or part of the property right it
represents.3 6
B. THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS REGARDING PATENT CLAIM
LANGUAGE

Since their inception, the United States patent statutes have required a
patentee to fully and dearly describe the subject matter and scope of the
invention. Thus, the United States has historically required the patent to
clearly put the public on notice of the boundaries of the invention.
1. TheEarly PatentActs. The First Congress convened the year after the
United States Constitution was ratified. Almost immediately, Congress
began receiving proposals for statutes implementing the Intellectual Property
Clause in the Constitution.3 However, Congress did not enact a patent
statute until 1790. On January 8 of that year, President George Washington
addressed Congress about the state of the union. He emphasized "the
expediency of giving effectual encouragement, as well to the introduction of
new and useful inventions from abroad, as to the exertions of skill and genius

Chisum, supra note 23, at OV-2.
" Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978-79, 34

U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329

(Fed. Cir. 1995), affld, 517 U.S. 370,38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (1996).
Il at 978-79.
"

Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 19 (1829).

Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917).

s Howard I. Forman, Two Hundred Years ofAmerican PatentLaw, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT

LAW 28 (1977).
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in producing them at home."" Soon thereafter, on April 10, 1790, President
Washington signed the first patent statute.39
The Act of 1790 authorized the issuance of a patent for "any useful art,
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein not
before known or used,"' and provided that a designated group of executive
officers"1 determined that the invention was "sufficiently useful and
important." 2 The 1790 Act required the patent applicant to file a specification "so particular," and if feasible a model of the invention "so exact," that
it could be distinguished from the prior art and that a skilled person could
replicate it "to the end that the public may have the full benefit thereof, after
the expiration of the patent term."43 This requirement allowed the
government officers reviewing the application to have the "full means to
examine and understand the claim to an invention better, and decide more
judiciously whether to grant a patent or not."" In addition, the Act's
supporters believed that the required specific disclosures would give the
world fuller and more accurate descriptions of the invention than required
under the laws and practice in England.4" The 1790 Act also provided that,
in defending against a patent infringement action, a party could introduce
evidence "tending to prove that the specification. . does not contain the
whole of the truth concerning his invention or discovery; or that it contains
more than is necessary to produce the effect described."'
Three years later, Congress replaced the 1790 Act.47 Unlike the prior
Act, the Act of 1793 gave patent issuing. responsibilities to the Secretary of
State.48 Patentable subject matter was expanded to include the composition
of matter or improvements thereon.49 The Act also required the applicant
to "deliver a written description of his invention, . . ., in such full, clear and
exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things before known,

3Id
1Id;
Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, S 1, 1 Stat. 109-110 (repealed 1793).
' Act of April 10, 1790, S 1, 1 Star. 109-110.
" The Secretary of State, the Secretary of War and the Attorney General. Id

421d

43Id

S 2.

" See Hogg v. Emerson, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 437, 479-80 (1848) (discussing the 1790 Act).
45 Id

Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, S 6, 1 Stat. 111 (repealed 1793).
Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Star. 318 (amended 1836).
4 Id. S 1, 1 Stat. 319-320.
11Id S1, 1Star. 319.
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and to enable any person skilled in the art or science.., to make, compound, and use the same," s° although this description was not actually
entitled a "specification." The 1793 Act included the defense of an incomplete or unclear specification, as seen in the prior Act."1
Thus, under the first two Patent Acts, the specification had two purposes.
First, it disclosed the manner of constructing the invention so as to enable
artisans to make and use it; consequently, the specification allowed the
public full benefit of the invention after expiration of the patent term. 2
Second, it put the public on notice as to what the patentee claimed as his
own invention so that others would not innocently infringe the patent. 3 As
early as 1832, the Supreme Court concluded that the requirement of a
correct specification and description of the invention did not depend on
whether or not the inventor intended to deceive the publicY According to
the Court, the appropriate question was whether or not the patent made the
public aware of the scope of the invention. 5
While the first Patent Acts required specific disclosure of an invention,
the Acts did not require claims nor did they require a thorough examination
of the patent application.' Apparently, the omission of these requirements
drove Eli Whitney out of business.5 7 Whitney filed a fairly detailed
specification of the cotton gin. Unfortunately, the invention was easy to
copy. Competitors and copyists simply filed nearly-identical patent
applications to receive their own patents. 8
In 1836, Congress enacted and President Andrew Jackson signed a major
revision to the patent laws. 9 The 1836 Act created a Patent Office as well
as a system for examining patent applications. Thus, for the first time, a
governmental body, rather than a few individuals, were to examine patent
applications to determine their novelty and worthiness of receiving a

Id. S3, 1 Stat. 321.
I. S 6, 1 Stat. 322.
sa Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356,433 (1822).
Id; see also Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218,247 (1832) (stating that a correct specification

and description of the invention was 'necessary in order to give the public, after the privilege shall expire,
the advantage for which the privilege is allowed, and is
the foundation of the power to issue the patent*).
s'Grant,31 U.S. at 246-47.
" Id at 247.
s'Homer J. Schneider, Claims to Fame, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMAI
s Id at 145.
Id

OFF.SOC'Y 143, 144 (1989).

s Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117.
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patent.' The new Act not only retained the specification requirements, but
it also introduced the requirement of clear claiming.6 1 In addition to
describing the invention in the specification and drawings, the inventor
needed to "particularly specify and point out the part, improvement, or
combination, which he claim[ed] as his own invention."'62 A patent could be
invalidated because of a "defective or insufficient description or specification,
or by reason of the patentee claiming in his specification as his own
invention, more than he had or shall have a right to claim as new."" Thus,
the concept of the patent claim, separate from the specification, was born.
In 1870, Congress replaced the 1836 Act. For the most part, the 1870 Act
retained the 1836 Act's provisions. However, the 1870 Act further required
the applicant to "particularly point out and distinctly claim" the invention.'
Thus developed a basic tenet in American patent law: the patent claims
"measure the invention." 6 ' Everything claimed, if it is rightfully patentable,
is protected; everything not claimed, even if it would have been patentable
by the inventor, is not protected, but is dedicated to the public.6
In addition, the patent laws now specifically required exactness in the
claim language.67 This requirement not only secured the inventor all to
which he was entitled, but it also apprised the public of what was still open.6

" 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATEmTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS SS 48-50 (1890).

6' Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, S 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119.
62 I

6Id. S 13,5 Stat. at 122.

Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, S 26,16 Stat. 198,201. The Act also specifically distinguished between
the specification and the claims. Id.
See, e.g., Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405,419 (1908) (explaining that while

the inventor must describe the best mode of applying the principle of his invention, the description does
not necessarily measure the invention).
Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877); see also Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 509 (1917); McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 423-24
(1891).
'7 See Act of July 8, 1870, 5 26, 16 Stat. 201 (requiring the claims to "particularly point out and
distinctly claim").
" McClain,141 U.S. at 424; see also General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364,369
(1938) ("Patents, whether basic or for improvements, must comply accurately and precisely with the
statutory requirement as to claims of invention or discovery. The limits of a patent must be known for
the protection of the patentee, the encouragement ofthe inventive genius ofothers, and the assurance that
the subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public. The statute seeks to guard against
unreasonable advantages to the patentee and disadvantages to others arising from uncertainty as to their
rights. The inventor must 'inform the public during the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly
asserted, so that it may be known which features may be safely used or manufactured without a license
and which may not.' ") (citations omitted); White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1886) ("Some persons
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The clear claiming provision relieved the courts "from the duty of ascertaining the exact invention of the patentee by inference and conjecture, derived
from a laborious examination of previous inventions, and a comparison
thereof with that claimed by him." 9
Thus, since 1836, the patent laws have not only required that an applicant
fully explain the invention, but they also have demanded that the inventor
specify and point out that which he claims as his own invention or
discovery. As the Supreme Court proclaimed in 1876, in language easily
applicable to our "modern," "high-tech" world, the United States patent
system was so well-developed that claim language could (and should) be
sufficiently clear and precise:
The growth of the patent system in the last quarter of a
century in this country has reached a stage in its progress
where the variety and magnitude of the interests involved
required accuracy, precision, and care in the preparation of
all the papers on which the patent is founded. It is no
longer a scarcely recognized principle, struggling for a
foothold, but it is an organized system, with well-settled
rules, supporting itself at once by its utility, and by the
wealth which it creates and commands. The developed and
improved condition of the patent law, and of the principles
which govern the exclusive rights conferred by it, leave no
excuse for ambiguous language or vague descriptions. The
public should not be deprived of rights supposed to belong
to it, without being clearly told what it is that limits these
rights. The genius of the inventor, constantly making
improvements in existing patents,-a process which gives to
the patent system its greatest value-should not be restrained

seem to suppose that a claim in a patent is like a nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any
direction, by merely referring to the specification, so as to make it include something more than, or
something different from, what its words express. The context may, undoubtedly, be resorted to, and
often is resorted to, for the purpose of better understanding the meaning of the claim; but not for the
purpose of changing it, and making it different from what it is. The claim is a statutory requirement,
prescribed for the very purpose of making the patentee define precisely what his invention is; and it is
unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain

import of its terms.").

69Keystone Bridge, 95 U.S. at 278.
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by vague and indefinite descriptions of claims..
[N]othing can be more just and fair, both to the patentee
and to the public, than that the former should understand,
and correctly describe, just what he has invented, and for
what he claims a patent.7'

2. The PatentAct of 1952. In 1952, Congress passed yet another patent
act." For the most part, this Act, contained in Title 35 of the United States
Code,' remains in effect today. To a large extent, the 1952 Act simply
rearranged prior statutory provisions and adopted, by statute, court decisions
and Patent Office practice.73 Section 112 of the 1952 Act retained the
requirement that the inventor dearly claim the patent's scope.74
The first two paragraphs of the current S 112 and their progeny combine
to require the patentee to describe the invention so that others may construct
and use it after expiration of the patent, and to inform the public so that it
may be known which features may be safely used or manufactured." The
first paragraph of S 112 requires that the specification "contain a written
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person

Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1876).

Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792.
35 U.S.C. SS 1-376 (1994).
n Chisum, supra note 23, at OV-12.
35 US.C. S 112 (1994).
7sSchriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47, 57, 39 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 242, 245-46
(1938) (The object of the statute isto require the patentee to describe his invention so that others may
construct and use it after the expiration of the patent and 'to inform the public during the life of the
patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it may be known which features may be safely used
or manufactured without a license'....") (citations omitted); Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil &
Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484, 61 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 382, 388 (1944) ("As a reward for inventions and to
encourage their disclosure, the United States offers a seventeen-year monopoly to an inventor who
refrains from keeping his invention a trade secret. But the quidpro quo isdisclosure of a process or device
in sufficient detail to enable one skilled in the art to practice the invention once the period of the
monopoly has expired; and the same precision of disclosure is likewise essential to warn the industry
concerned of the precise scope of the monopoly asserted.") (citations omitted); London v. Carson Pirie
Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Hoganas AB v.
Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 951, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936, 1939 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that the
function of the claim isto put one skilled in the art on notice); Application of Hammack, 427 Fad 1378,
1382 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (stating that the paragraph two and its progeny provides those working in the area
of patent "with the adequate notice demanded by due process of law, so that they may more readily and
accurately determine the boundaries of protection involved and evaluate the possibility of infringement
and dominance") (citations omitted).
2
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skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same . ... "76 Paragraph one of S 112 further
requires the applicant to "set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention."' Paragraph two of S 112 demands
that the specification "conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention. " "
Although the first two paragraphs of S 112 serve the same purpose, i.e.,
to put the public on notice of the scope of the patent, the requirements of
the two paragraphs are analytically distinct. 9 The first paragraph of S 112
concerns the specification and adequacy of the invention's description.'0 It
requires that the inventor adequately disclose the invention itself (the
"description" requirement), the manner and process of making and using the
invention (the "enablement" requirement), and the best mode of carrying out
the invention contemplated by the inventor at the time of filing (the "best
mode" requirement)."1 Only the second paragraph of S 112 contains
statutory requirements regarding the claim language itself.82 The claims must
particularly point but and distinctly claim the subject matter which is sought
to be patented. 3 If the claims fail to meet this requirement, the patent will
be held invalid as indefinite.8 '
"Definiteness" means that "the language of the claims must clearly set
forth the area over which the applicant seeks exclusive rights."" The
requirement demands precision and definiteness in the language of the claim

" 35 U.S.C. S 112, 1 1 (1994).
.7

l 12.

Rengo Co. v. Moins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 550, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303 (3d Cir. 1981);
Hammack, 427 F.2d at 1381; Application of Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 909, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 642
(C.C.P.A. 1970); seealso Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1469-70,28 U.S.P.Q.2d
"

(BNA) 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (reading the indefiniteness requirement of S 112, 12, as separate from the
requirement of enablement).
" 35 U.S.C. S 112 (1994), 11.
' Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 293 (Fed. Cit.
1985).

Id.; Rengo, 657 F.2d at 551.
35 U.S.C. S 112 (1994), 2 (providing that claims must particularly point out and distinctly claim
the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention); see also Borkowski, 422 F.2d at 909 ('In
reality, this means that applicant must particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject mattersought
to be patented.') (emphasis in original).
4 Norton Co. v. Bendix Corp., 449 F.2d 553, 555, 171 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 449 (2d Cir. 1971).
*sRengo, 657 F.2d at 551 (citations omitted).
"
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itself (as opposed to adequate disclosure or description)., 6 In Rengo Co. v.
Molins Machine Co.,"7 the Third Circuit addressed the difference between the
description and definiteness requirements:
[T]here is a subtle relationship between the policies underlying the description and definiteness requirements, as the two
standards, while complementary, approach a similar problem from different directions. Adequate description of the
invention guards against the inventor's overreaching by
insisting that he recount his invention in such detail that his
future claims can be determined to be encompassed within
his original creation. The definiteness requirement shapes
the future conduct of persons other than the inventor, by
insisting that they receive notice of the scope of the patented
device."8
Thus, the definiteness requirement fulfills a public notice function. The
applicant must claim the invention with sufficient definiteness to enable
others to discern the boundaries of the purported invention in order to
provide notice to others of the limits "beyond which experimentation and
invention are undertaken at the risk of infringement." 9
The test for definiteness is whether a claim, when read in light of the
specification, reasonably apprises those skilled in the art both of the
utilization and of the patent's scope.' Importantly, an indefiniteness analysis
not only considers the claim language, but it also looks at the specification
and the complete patent document.91 If the claims, read in light of the

;a;
Borkowski, 422 F.2d at 909.
'z
"
"

657 F.2d 535 (3d Cir. 1981).
Rengo, 657 F.2d at 551.
Norton, 449 F.2d at 555; see also Rengo, 657 F.2d at 551.

90 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1217, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1016, 1030 (Fed.
Cir. 1991); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 624,225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
634, 641 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 258 F.2d 124, 136, 118
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 122, 132 (2d Cir. 1958).
91 Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (Fed.
Cir. 1986); Standard Oil Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448,452,227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 293,296 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (stating that the specification isthe primary basis for construing the claims. "The allowability,
or validity, of a claim depends, of course, on its subject matter meeting the statutory requirements for
patentability and on the claim, per se, being 'distinct'-e, having a clear and definite meaning when
construed in the light of the complete patent document.").
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specifications, reasonably apprise those skilled in the art both of the
utilization and scope of the invention and if the language is as precise as the
subject matter permits, the courts can demand no more. The existence of an
inescapable uncertainty will not deny the patentee of the fruits of his
invention.'
In addition, the prosecution history may be relevant in determining
whether the claims are sufficiently definite.93 At trial, an expert may even
testify as to the meaning of the claims with respect to the relevant art."4 The
essential question is whether one who really wished to respect the patent
would have any difficulty in identifying what the claim covered."'
If the scope of the subject matter embraced by a claim is clear and if the
applicant has not otherwise indicated that he intends that claim to be of a
different scope, then the claim particularly points out and distinctly claims
the subject matter which the applicant seeks to patent.' In contrast, if the
claims serve as "a shadowy framework" upon which are located words
"lacking in precise referents in the specification" and requiring "elaborate
explanations extraneous to both the specification and the claims," the claims
are indefinite' and the patent is invalid. Thus, the indefiniteness cases focus
on the language of precision. Are the claims specific enough and do they
contain enough detail?98 "A determination of claim indefiniteness is a legal
conclusion that is drawn from the court's performance of its duty as the

2 Georgia-Pacific,258 F.2d at 136.
93 See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1461, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330

(Fed. Cir. 1998); In reMorris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1029-30 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
J.T. Eaton & Co. v. At. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 1570,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1646 (Fed.
Cir. 1997); Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1218.
" See N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1580, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333,
1339-40 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1218; ShatterproofGlas, 758 F.2d at 624; cf Personalized
Media Communications, L.L.C. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 161 F.3d 696, 700,48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1880,
1884 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding of indefiniteness included consideration of expert testimony regarding how
one of ordinary skill in the art would understand terms); id. at 706 (suggesting that extrinsic evidence may
be appropriate as to the issue of indefiniteness if the terms are ambiguous).
" Georgia-Pacific,258 F.2d at 138; Musher Found., Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 150 F.2d 885, 889,66
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 183, 187 (2d Cit. 1945).
"In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 909, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 642, 645 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
In re Hammack, 427 F.2d 1378, 1381-82, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 204, 207 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
See, e-g., N. Am. Vaccine, 7 F.3d at 1578-80 (focusing on the issue of whether, in view of the
specification, one skilled in the art would know that the polysaccharides recited in the claims refer only
to stereotypes that would result in a "clean backbone"); ShatterproofGlass,758 F.2d at 624 (focusing on
the definiteness issue regarding claimant's failure to recite the size of the glass sheets and the quality of

coating).
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construer of patent claims."" As such, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly
stated that the issue of definiteness is a question of law." °
Thus, the statutory history and the current patent statutes are clear. In
order to provide notice to the public of the matters covered by the patent,
the patent itself must articulate and claim the scope of the invention. The
claim must be so clear that one skilled in the art reasonably understands the
patent's scope and the limits of patent protection.
C. PATENT LITIGATION: THE INCREASING PRESSURE OF CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION ON THE TRIAL COURTS

In recent decades, patent infringement litigation has exploded. In
addition, patentees now demand jury instead of bench trials. As a result, the
trial courts face increasing pressure when hearing and deciding how to
interpret claim terms disputed by the parties.
1. Claim Constructionis a CriticalIssue in PatentInfringement Litigation.
Patent infringement is the unauthorized production, use, sale or offer to sell
any patented invention.' 1 To enforce against infringement, the patent
owner can file an action in the United States District Court."° In the
lawsuit, the patent owner has the burden of proving that the accused device
infringes the patent. 0 3 An accused infringer may assert defenses to the
infringement charge, such as invalidity, unenforceability, laches, misuse or
experimental use.""
The determination of patent infringement involves a two-step process.
First, the claim is interpreted to determine its proper scope and meaning.
This process is called "claim construction" or "claim interpretation." Second,
a fact finder must determine whether the accused device falls within the
scope of the properly interpreted claim.'

PersonalizedMedia Communications, 161 F.3d at 705.
1w ld.at 702; Nortb Am. Vaccine, 7 F.3d at 1579; Miles Lab., Inc. v. Shandon, Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 874,
27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123 (Fed. Cit. 1993); Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d
1565, 1576, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1986); ShatterproofGlass,758 F.2d at 624.
1"35 U.S.C. S 271(a) (1994).
"2 28 U.S.C. S 1338 (1994); 35 U.S.C. S 281 (1994).
103

SeeUNIFORMJURYINSTRUcTIONSFORPATENTCASESINTHEUNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCouRT

FOR THE DISTRIcT OF DELAWARE, 1.3 (1993).
104

DONALD S. CISUM ET AL., UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 2-233 (1992).

t" Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426 (Fed. Ci. 1992).
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The first step involves a linguistic and technical dispute about the
meaning of claim terms and the scope of the claim. The dispute is not
simply an academic exercise but strikes at the heart of any patent case. A
decision on a specific claim construction can dispose of the entire case.'°,
The issue does not raise an objective straight-forward issue. Instead, each
party often has a strategic interest in advocating a particular claim construction. Typically, a patentee will advocate a broad interpretation of the claim
in order to pursue an easier infringement proof. 0 7 In contrast, the accused
will typically advance a more narrow view of the claim. Moreover, claim
construction disputes usually involve a number of different terms which the
trial court must decide."° Thus, in virtually all patent infringement cases,
the parties have a significant claim construction dispute about a number of
different claims.' ° As discussed more below, the trial judge shoulders the
heavy burden of interpreting all of these disputed terms which are highly
likely to change at the appellate level.1" 0
2. The Explosion of PatentInfringement Litigation. Claim construction
issues have become, and will continue to be, a critical issue in patent
infringement law, in part, because of the explosion of patent litigation and
the new corporate attitude toward patents. In the 1980s, patent infringement
litigation dramatically increased. In the next decade, it exploded. For

10

Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir.

1995) (Mayer J., concurring), affid 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (1996); see also, e.g., EMI
Group N. Am., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 157 F.3d 887,892,48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding
that the district court's claim construction was dispositive of literal infringement); Schering Corp. v.
Amgen, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 375, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1051 (D. Del. 1999) (dismissing case after plaintiffpatentee moved for summary judgment in favor of defendant because it could no longer pursue a case of
infringement after the district court's dispositive construction of literal infringement); c Smiths Indus.
Med. Sys. v. Vital Signs, 183 F.3d 1347,1353, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ('[B]y resolving

the meaning to be given to disputed claim terms, and by engaging the parties in such a process, trial courts
are often able to narrow disputes and provide more efficient trials.").
107While the patent owner wants a construction that is so broad that it captures the accused device,
the owner must be careful not to offer a proposed construction that isso broad that the claims are judged
invalid. Douglas Y'Barbo, Is Extrinsic Evidence Necessary to Resolve.. Claim ConstructionDisputes? Part
I, 81J. PAT. & TRADE OFF. Soc'y 687, 718 (1999).

to See, e.g., Scriptgen Pharm., Inc. v. 3-Dimensional Pharm., 79 F. Supp. 2d, 409 (D. Del. 1999)
(involving the construction of twelve terms); Novo Nordisk v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. CIV.A. 98-643 MMS
1999 WL 1094213 (D. Del. Nov. 18, 1999) (involving the construction of eleven terms).
' Claim construction disputes are not a new phenomenon. As one court commented in 1868: "It
is, indeed, to be regretted that so great a proportion of the industry and intellectual acumen expended
upon patents should be devoted to assailing, circumventing or defeating them, rather than to their original
construction." Blake v. Stafford, 3 F. Cas. 610, 612 (C.C. D. Conn. 1868).
"o See infra notes 215-17.
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example, in the late 1980s, the number of patent cases gradually increased
from 1,129 to 1,215.111 In 1992, 1,474 patent cases were filed, nearly a 26%
increase from the prior year."1 Patent filings have continued to increase,
including a nearly 15% increase in 1997 and a 25% increase in 1998.'
Moreover, patent litigation is expected to substantially increase over the next
five years. 4
The increase in patent litigation may be due to the new corporate view
of intellectual property and intellectual property litigation."' Increasingly,
companies are using patents to protect their market share, drive competitors
out of business' 16 and boost bottom lines through lucrative judgments and

'"1990DIRECTOR Or THE ADmN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 140, Table C-2A.
2

1992 DIRECTOR OF THE ADmsN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTs. 183, Table C-2A.

"'1997 DIRECTOR Or THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. 133, Table C-2A; 1998

DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 147, Table C-2A.
"' See Is There a Futurefor IP and If So, at What Price?,PWC FinancialAdvisory Services Analysis of
LP.LF. SurveyResponses,at http://www.pwcglobalcom/extweb/ncsurvres.nsf/DocID/9F14FCCEEB&
409DE852568B900515A02 [hereinafter PricewaterbouseCoopersSurvey] (discussing February 2000 survey
of leading intellectual property practitioners, including judges, litigators, and corporate counsel, indicates
that 90% of the respondents believed that there will be more intellectual property litigation over the next

few years. In addition, 59% responded that there will be "much more' litigation. The respondents
predicted that the majority of the future litigation will be in the patent arena).
"' Corporations are becoming much more aggressive about their existing and potential intellectual
property. See, e.g., Paul T Dacie: Hi-Tecb Business Needs Higher Tech Courts, METROPOLITAN CORP.

COUNS., Apr. 2000, at 40 (interview with Paul T. Dacier, Senior Vice President and General Counsel,
EMC Corporation) ('We feel that in order for us to maintain our competitive position we must protect
our intellectual property. Over the years, we have encountered people and companies that do not respect
the intellectual property of others and will make efforts to obtain it unlawfully. It is important that we
and other hi-tech companies be able to mount a quick response to those who try to take technology or
otherwise misappropriate our intellectual property."). In addition, companies are beginning to view
intellectual property and related litigation as a business strategy. See, eg., Bruce Rubenstein, Dominance
of a New Industry at Stake, CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 1999, at 29 (quoting Monsanto's Assistant
General Counsel-Litigation, David F. Snively, 'Our business, litigation and patent strategies have a
common focus, and we have regular strategy sessions among the leadership of the different groups.").
1 For example, the Polaroid Corporation engaged in a fifteen year battle against the Eastman Kodak
Company, claiming that Kodak had infringed several pioneering Polaroid patents involving instant camera
and films. In 1985, Kodak lost the case and exited the instant photography business ayear later. In 1991,
the parties finally settled the case and Kodak agreed to pay Polaroid $925 million. Kodak pays Polaroid
over Patent Dispute, TORONTO STAR, July 16, 1991, at C3, availablein 1991 WL 9500498; see also, e.g.,
Erik Espe, FriendlierCourts, HigherStakes UnleashPatent Suits, BUSINESs JOURNAL, July 2, 1999, at 1,
availablein 1999 WL 31942725 (in 1999, San Jose-based software maker Quickturn Design Systems settled
for $3million with its competitor Mentor Graphics Corporation. "Mentor also agreed not to sell its
versions of the technology in the United States."); Erik Espe, Creative Spin on PatentCases Rubs Winner
the Wrong Way, THE BUSINESSJOURNAL, Dec. 17,1999, at 13, availablein 1999 WL 10352778 (reporting

on the lawsuit between Creative Technology and Aureal. Although Aureal won the patent infringement
case, the company still lost lucrative contracts and struggled to stay afloat.).
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licensing fees."'7 Today, companies should not only patent their core
technology, but they should also patent their "complementary" intellectual
property."' A broad-based patent portfolio provides a company with
patents it cannot only assert offensively against a potential infringer, but it
also gives the company defensive leverage if it is the subject of a patent
infringement lawsuit or seeks a more advantageous cross-licensing
agreement. 9 In addition, companies can generate significant profits by
licensing patents to third parties.120 The licensing of complementary
technology may generate profits without risking the company's competitive
position in its core business.2 1 Finally, new companies often need a strong
patent portfolio to attract investment capital.'
In short, companies are
increasing their efforts to protect and profit from their intellectual property
and patents. At the same time, patent litigation has increasingly become an
accepted method of business practice in the United States.
3. The Increase in Patentjury Trials. Claim construction has developed
into a critical problem for the trial courts because, at the same time patent
litigation exploded, litigants began to demand jury trials. Prior to the 1980s,
claim construction issues did not present significant procedural issues because
most patent trials were bench trials.' Claim construction disputes could
easily be handled at trial with little practical concern about whether the
dispute presented a legal or factual issue.
Today, not only have the number of patent lawsuits increased dramatically, but the number of patent jury trials has exploded. In 1974, patent
owners tried only seven percent of their cases to juries. 24 By 1994, seventy
" For example, Texas Instruments, which holds patents in such basic technologies as chip
manufacturing and software systems, is believed to have generated significantly more than $2 billion in
licensing fees since 1987. Kevin Rivette & Irving Rappaport, Golden Opportunities, LEGAL TIMES:
SPECIAL REPORT-INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, WEALTH AND WORRIES, Dec. 19,1994, at 11.

" Andrew M. Riddles et al., Siart-Up CompaniesShouldDeviseIPStrategies, NAT'LL.J., Feb. 8,1999,

at C7.
119 Id.

" at For example, Honeywell collected $303 million in 1992 from eleven camera makers that
infringed on its patented auto-focus technology. Honeywell does not even use the technology in its own
products. Rivette & Rappaport, supra note 117, at 11.
2 See Riddles, supra note 118, at C7 (stating the importance of protecting complementary
technology).
Louis Rukeyser, Louis Rukeyser's Mutual Funds (Louis Rukeyser, McLean, VA), Sept. 2000, at 4-5.
" See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 336 n.30, 169 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 513, 522 (1971) (noting that from 1968 through 1970, only thirteen out of 382 patent cases (about

three percent) involved jury trials).
u2 Timothy L. Swabb, FederalCircuitCannot StopRunauawyJuryAward in PatentSuits: Companies
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percent of patent trialswere jury trials. 12 Presumably, the increased demand
for jury trials has resulted from the fact (and belief) that juries overwhelmingly find infringement. 126 In addition, most practitioners believe that jury
trials result in more lucrative damage awards." 7
With the advent of jury trials in patent cases, trial courts faced the
procedural question of how to handle claim construction issues. Some trial
courts treated claim construction as a jury issue. 12 s Others viewed claim
construction as a matter of law.'29 Indeed, the Federal Circuit appeared to
have issued conflicting decisions on the question of whether claim construction was a matter of law for the court,3 0 or a factual question for a jury to
determine.3
Finally, the Federal Circuit addressed (and resolved) this
dispute in the landmark case of Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.3
D. MARKMAN V. WESTVIEWINSTRUMEN7S, INC.

In 1989, Herbert Markman patented a method to monitor the inventory
of a dry cleaning business by using a computer system to log incoming and
outgoing clothing articles in the inventory of a dry cleaning establishment.'

Should Insure Themnselves Against this Risk, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: INTELL. PROP., Sept. 5, 1995, at 20.
' In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 980, n.1, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1406, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1907,
1908 n.l (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Nies, J., dissenting).
"' See PriceWaterhouseCoopers Survey, supra note 114 (reporting that sixty-six percent of
respondents believed that a jury trial, more than abench trial, would likely result in upholding patent
validity. Sixty-eight percent of respondents believed that ajury trial, rather than a bench trial, would
likely result in the finding of liability.); Brief for Amicus Curia, John T. Roberts nn.8, 9,Markman v.
Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370,38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996) (No. 95-26) (reporting that juries
find patent infringement eighty-five percent of the time), availableat 1995 WL 723674.
"v See PriceWaterhouseCoopers Survey, supra note 114 (reporting that eighty-eight percent of
respondents believed that ajury trial, more so than abench trial, would likely result in higher economic
damages).
" See, e.g., Mars, Inc. v. Conlux USA Corp., 818 F.Supp. 707,707-713,28 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161,
1161-65 (D. Del. 1998) (finding that the jury's interpretations of the claims were supported by substantial
evidence, the trial court denied defendant's motion for new trial).
1 See, eg., Genentech, Inc. v. Welcome Found. Ltd., No. C1V.A. 88-330, 1990 WL 69187, *4-6, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363, 1366-1368 (D. Del. Mar. 8, 1990) (interpreting the meaning of the claims after
viewing the evidence).
'-' Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816,822,23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426, 1431 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
..Tol-O-Matic v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1550, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1332, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
13252 F.3d 967,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affld, 517 U.S. 370,38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1461 (1996).
. See U.S. Reissue Patent No. 033054.
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A computer created a bar code label that was attached to an "article" in the
"inventory" processed through the dry cleaning cycle.' Using a bar code
reader, a proprietor could read in the bar coded items and generate a report
about the status of the dry cleaning inventory.' 5
The patent owner and his licensee"3 6 sued the manufacturer of a device
that allegedly infringed the Markman patent and a dry cleaner that used the
accused device. 37 At trial, the judge granted defendants' motion for a
directed verdict' (now entitled a judgment of a matter of law). In reaching
his decision, the trial judge held that the question of claim construction was
a matter of law. " 9 After interpreting the subject claim language, the trial
court found that, as a matter of law, the defendants did not infringe two of
the patent claims at issue."
1. The FederalCircuitOpinion. The Markman plaintiffs appealed to the
Federal Circuit.' They argued that the district court had erred in reversing
the jury's verdict as inconsistent with the claim terms because the jury, and
not the court, was required to interpret claim terms.142 A Federal Circuit
panel heard oral arguments on appeal and, sua sponte, ordered a hearing en
banc."3 In a landmark decision, the Federal Circuit announced that the
interpretation and construction of patent claims is a matter of law exclusively
for the court. The majority of the court"' concluded that "in a case tried to
a jury, the court has the power and the obligation to construe as a matter of
law the meaning of the language used in the patent claim.""' In addition, the
court concluded that because claim construction is a matter of law, the

34 Id.
13

Id.; see also Markman, 52 F.3d at 971-72.

Collectively referred to as "Markman."
Markman, 52 F.3d at 972.
1
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 722 F. Supp. 1535,20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1955 (E.D. Pa.
1991), affld en banc, 52 F.3d 967, affid, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
"' Id at 1536.
14 Id at 1537-38.
141 Markman, 52 F.3d 967.
"' id at 973-74,
143 Id at 971, n.1.
14 Chief Judge Archer, Circuit Judges Rich, Nies, Michel, Plager, Lourie, Clevenger and Schall.
"3

Circuit Judges Mayer and Rader filed concurring opinions and Circuit Judge Newman filed a dissent. See
id at 970.
...
Id at 979.
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Federal Circuit reviews claim construction issues de novo. '" As such, a
district court's claim interpretation is entitled to no deference. 47
The majority firmly rejected the suggestion that a patentee's subjective
intent as to claim terms may be an issue or even relevant. Instead, claim
interpretation involves the objective test of what one of ordinary skill in the
art at the time of the invention would have understood the term to mean. "8
Although the inventor's subjective intent is not an issue, the majority
recognized that extrinsic evidence might be helpful in clim construction to
explain scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the terms
of art that appear in the patent and prosecution history. The majority
defined extrinsic evidence as evidence external to the patent and prosecution
history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned
treatises."
The court recognized that a judge is not usually a person
conversant in the particular technical art involved and is not the hypothetical
person skilled in the art to whom a patent is addressed. Extrinsic evidence,
therefore, may be necessary to inform the court about the language in which
the patent is written. This evidence, however, is not for the purpose of
clarifying the ambiguity in claim terminology." Extrinsic evidence may not
vary or contradict the terms of the claims.'' The claim construction,
enlightened by such extrinsic evidence as may be helpful, is still based on the
patent and prosecution history."2 Nevertheless, expert evidence may
demonstrate the state of the prior art at the time of the invention. It is useful
to show what was then old, to distinguish what was new, and to aid the
court in its claim construction." 3 Thus, the trial court may, in its discretion,
receive extrinsic evidence."'4

146id
147

Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir. 2000);

Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Intern., Inc., 212 F.3d 1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en

banc).

148 Markman, 52 F.3d at 986-87; see also id. at 983 (rejecting testimony of Markman and Markman's
patent expert as having any controlling effect on the meaning of circumstances). As such, patent claim

construction is different from contract, deed or will construction. I, at 984-86.
14 Id at 980.
11 Id at 986.
I'dI.at 981 (citations omitted).
I,/at
d2 980 (citations omitted).
153

Markman, 52 F.3d at 980.
Ild at 980 (citations omitted).
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The majority specifically addressed the position raised in Judge Mayer's
concurring opinion and Judge Newman's dissent"'5 that claim interpretation
could involve a question of fact." s Judge Mayer suggested that the task of
determining the meaning of the claims to one skilled in the art was an issue
5 If, however, the
for the court."'
court could not readily resolve the meaning
of the claims, it should examine the extrinsic evidence. The content of the
prior art and the testimony of technical experts could reveal how others used
and understood technical terms. The inventor, as qualified as an expert,
could testify as to what his claims meant in the relevant art. The judge could
even consider the testimony of patent lawyers for advice on the interpretation of claims. If this information were uncontested, then the judge could
interpret the claim as a matter of law." 8 If, however, the extrinsic evidence
resulted in a genuine dispute over the meaning of a term or an event during
prosecution, the issue would be one of fact for the finder of fact to determine. 159
The majority specifically rejected this approach. It rejected the theory
that a patent was similar to a contract, whose interpretation, under certain
circumstances, would involve triable issues of fact, including the parties'
subjective intent.' 60 Instead, the majority analogized claim interpretation to
statutory construction, which is a matter of law strictly for the court. 61 "A
patent is a government grant of rights to the patentee." Thus, in claim
construction, the court defines the federal legal rights created by the patent
document.'62 Hence, claim construction is analogous to statutory construction. There can be only one correct interpretation of a statute. Statutes, like
patents, are enforceable against the public, unlike private agreements
between contracting parties. 63 The patentee's subjective intent as to claim

"' Id. at 989 (Mayer, J., concurring), 999, 1000-10 (Newman, J., dissenting). In contrast, in his
concurrence, Judge Rader reasoned that the evidentiary record lacked substantial evidence supporting
Markman's asserted claim interpretation. Id at 998. As such, the court's extensive examination of when
claim construction could involve subsidiary fact issues was dicta. Id. at 998.
156As such, if claim construction were indeed an issue of fact, it would be a jury question and not a
matter of law. Id. at 989-92.
17 Id. at 991.

1id
1Id

Markman, 52 F.3d at 985.
987.
"2 Id. at 978.
16 Id. at 987.
16

161Id. at
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terms is not at issue. Instead, the focus is on the objective test of what one
of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have understood the term to mean.164
After finding that claim construction is an issue of law, the majority
construed the disputed claim term "inventory." 6 ' In doing so, it considered
66
three sources: the claims, the specification and the prosecution history.'
It gave no deference to the testimony of Markman and his patent attorney
on the proper construction of the claim. 67
2. The Supreme Court Opinion. The Markman plaintiffs challenged the
Federal Circuit's opinion in the United States Supreme Court.'6" There, the
question presented was whether the interpretation of a patent claim "is a
matter of law reserved entirely for the court, or subject to a Seventh
Amendment guarantee that a jury will determine the meaning of any
disputed term of art about which expert testimony is offered." 69 The
Supreme Court held that, although patent infringement cases must be tried
to a jury,"17 "the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its
claims, is exclusively within the province of the court."''
The decision was based primarily on the "functional considerations" of
whether the judge or jury should resolve claim interpretation questions. 2
The Court concluded that judges, not juries, "are the better suited to find the
acquired meaning of patent terms."""3 The construction of written instruments is something that judges often do and are likely to do better than
74

jurors.

1

The Supreme Court did not address the issue of the propriety or role of
extrinsic evidence in claim construction. However, the Court's opinion

"4 Id at 986-87. Thus, the Markman trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to admit
the extrinsic evidence offered by Markman, ie, Markman's testimony and the testimony of a patent
expert, on the issue of claim construction. The trial court properly rejected this extrinsic evidence to the
extent it contradicted the court's construction of the claims based on the specification and prosecution
history. Id at 981.
'6s
Markman, 52 F.3d at 979-83.
'"6I6 at 979.
"6 Id at 983.
" Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996).
t6 Id at 372.

f7
Id at 377.
7

Id at 372.

tn Id at 389.
"n Markman, 517 U.S. at 388.
u4 Id at 388.
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assumed that expert testimony would be permitted. The Court specifically
framed the issue as whether a judge or jury should "determine the meaning
of any disputed term of art about which expert testimony is offered."
In
addition, the Court recognized that claim construction would involve
credibility judgments "about the experts who testify in patent cases." 176 As
a practical matter, the Court was "doubtful" that many cases would actually
present the situation of competing experts whose testimony was equally
consistent with a patent's internal logic.17 In any event, such credibility
determinations would be subsumed within the analysis of the patent
document and would be solved by the standard construction rule that a term
can be defined only in a way that comports with the instrument as a
whole. 178 Although the Court did not specifically address the question of
whether the appellate standard review of claim construction is de novo, 79
clearly this is the only standard available given that the issue presented is a
matter of law.'
3. The Federal Circuit and Supreme Court Both Recognized the Need for
Certainty. Importantly, in both Markman opinions, the Federal Circuit and
the Supreme Court recognized the need for certainty and predictability in
claim construction. As the Federal Circuit noted, "it is only fair (and
statutorily required) that competitors be able to ascertain to a reasonable
degree the scope of the patentee's right to exclude" others from the
invention. 1 ' Indeed, certainty and predictability were reasons to limit the
evidence and claim construction issues.1 12 Competitors should be able to
"rest assured" that if infringement litigation occurs, a judge, trained in the
law, will similarly analyze the patent and its associated public record and
apply the established rules of construction.8 3

"

il at 372

,I' a at 389.
tn Id.

In7
Markman, 517 U.S. at 389.
"
11

See id at 370-90.
See Steven Alan Childress & Martha S. Davis, 1 FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW S 2.14, at 2-79

(3d ed. 1999) (explaining that de novo review applies to issue of "notfact, or enough law that free review
is warranted.").
" Markman, 52 F.3d at 978-79.
13 See id (The public "may understand what is the scope of the patent owner's rights by obtaining
the patent and prosecution history-'the undisputed public record' and applying established rules of
construction to the language of the patent claim in the context of the patent.") (citations omitted).
1.. Id at979.
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The Supreme Court also recognized the need for certainty in its decision.
The Court specifically cited the importance of uniform treatment as a reason
to allocate all issues of construction to the court."8 4 "'The limits of a patent
must be known for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the
inventive genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the patent
will be dedicated ultimately to the public.' "185 Otherwise, a " 'zone of
uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the risk
of infringement claims would discourage invention only a little less than
unequivocal foreclosure of the field' "186 and " 'the public [would] be
deprived of rights supposed to belong to it, without being clearly told what
it is that limits these rights.' "18
E. COMMENTATORS CRITICIZE THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION APPROACH IN MARKMAN

Various commentators and practitioners have discussed and criticized the
Federal Circuit's approach to claim construction issues. 8 ' The discourse
usually focuses on two somewhat related areas: the use of extrinsic evidence
in claim construction"8 9 and the Federal Circuit's imposition of a de novo

"' Markman, 517 U.S. at 390.
"85

Id (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369,37 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)

466 (1938)).
..
6 Markman, 517 U.S. at 390 (quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228,236,
55 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 381 (1942)).
w Id (quoting Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1877)).
l See infra notes 189-9 1.
19 See Douglas Y'Barbo, Is ExtrinsicEvidenceEver Necessary to Decide Claim ConstructionDisputes?
Part I 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 101, 106-33 (2000); W. Thad Adams, IH1,& J. Derel
Monteith, Jr., The ContinuingSaga ofFederalCircuit PatentClaim ConstructionJurisprudence: Extrinsic
Evidence and Other Stories, 8 FED. CIR. BJ. 83 (1999); M. Reed Staheli, Comment, DeservedDeference:
Reconsideringthe De Novo StandardofReview for Claim Construction, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
181, 186-89 (1999); Douglas Y'Barbo, Is Extrinsic Evidence Necessary to Resolve: Claim Construction
Disputes?Part181 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 687, 687-727 (1999); James B. Altman et al., The
Law of Patent Claim Interpretation: The Revolution Isn't Finished, 8 FED. CIR. B.J. 93, 94-112 (1998);
Michael 0. Sutton et al., Don't Miss the Mark, Man! Recent Trends And Evidentiary Considerationsin
Markman Hearings, in 18TH ANNUAL INSTITrUTE ON COMPUTER LAW, at 867, 871-886 (PLI Pats.,
Copyright, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G4-4042, 1998); W. Edward
Bailey, UnresolvedIssues in a Post-Markman World, in PATENT LITIGATION 1997, at 339, 353-358 (PLI
Pats., Copyright, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G4-4022, 1997); Greg J.
Michelson, Note & Comment, Did the Markman Court Ignore Fact, Substance, and the Spirit of the
Constitutionin its Rush Toward Uniformity?, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1749,1767-68 (1997); Clyde F. Willian
& Joseph S. Miller, Muddy Waters: Infringement Analysis afterMarkman and Warner-Jenkinson, 7 FED.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2001

25

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 2

. INTELL. PROP.L.

[Vol. 8:175

standard of review. 0 In addition, practitioners often debate the procedural
issues raised by Markman, i.e., when and by what procedure should the trial
court interpret the claims.191
1. The Role of Extrinsic Evidence. Soon after the Supreme Court's
Markman decision, the Federal Circuit again considered the use of extrinsic
evidence in claim construction. In Vitronics Corp.v. Conceptronic,Inc.," the
Federal Circuit delineated the evidence for consideration in a claim
construction determination. As Vitronics noted, "the court should look first
to the intrinsic evidence of record, i.e., the patent itself, including the claims,
the specification and, if in evidence, the prosecution history." 93 Of the
intrinsic evidence, the claim language itself is of first and foremost importance when construing the meaning of the patent. 94 If the claim is unambiguous and clear on its face, the court need not consider the other intrinsic
evidence.19
In Vitronics, the court held that "[I]n those cases where the public record
unambiguously describes the scope of the patented invention, reliance on
any extrinsic evidence is improper."' Because of the public notice function
of a patent, claim construction can only be determined by the public
record."9 ' In addition, if the intrinsic evidence does not solve the claim

Cut. Bj. 227,237-241 (1997).
" See Y'Barbo, Part U, supra note 189, at 101-06; Luke L. Dauchot, The Federal Circuit's De Novo
Review ofPatent Claim Construction " A Needfor a More BalancedApproacb, 18 No. 1 INTELL. PROP. L.
NEWSL., 1, 4-7 (1999); Staheli, supra note 189, at 199-202; see Michelson, supra note 189, at 1766-68;
Willian, supra note 189, at 228-30.
1

See Mark L. Austrian & Shaun Mohler, Timing is Everytbing in PatentLitigation-Fulfdlingthe

Promise ofMarkman, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 227 (1999); Sutton, supranote 189, at 890-94; Bailey, supranote 189,
at 343-52; see also Frank M. Gasparo, Note & Comment, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. and its
ProceduralShock Wave: Tbe Markman Hearing,5J.L. & POL'Y 723 (1997) (discussing the need for a pre-

trial Markman hearing preceded by extensive discovery to construe a patent's claims).
192 90 F.3d 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
193 d at 1582.
1
Smiths Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Vital Signs, Inc., 183 F.3d 1347, 1357,51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1415,
1421 (Fed. Cir. 1999);Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985,989,50 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1607 (Fed. Cir. 1999), affd 175 F.3d 985, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1607 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
19s See
itral Signs, 183 F.3d at 1357 (citations omitted) (holding that the lower court erred by
importing limitations from the written description into the claim because the claim language was
unambiguous on its face).
1/Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583.

1

As the Vitronics court noted:

The claims, specification, and file history, rather than extrinsic evidence, constitute
the public record of the patentee's claim, a record on which the public isentitled to
rely. In other words, competitors are entitled to review the public record, apply the
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interpretation problem, the court may consider extrinsic evidence to
understand the technology and to construe the claims.'98 The trial judge has
the discretion to consider extrinsic evidence, including treatises, dictionaries
and expert testimony, to better understand the underlying technology at
issue.
2. StandardofReview. The Federal Circuit has clearly pronounced the
standard of appellate review applicable to claim construction decisions. In
its Markman decision, the Federal Circuit ruled that claim construction is a
matter of law that it reviews de novo on appeal.'" In 1998, the Federal
Circuit reaffirmed this principle in the en banc decision of Cybor Corp. v.
FAS Technologies, Inc.2' It specifically disavowed any language in previous
opinions that suggested or held to the contrary.'O Since claim construction
is a legal question, the Federal Circuit "review[s] claim construction de novo
on appeal including any allegedly fact-based questions relating to claim
construction." 2" Thus, the Federal Circuit has flatly rejected the theory that
claim construction involves a mixed question of law and fact.20 3 In addition,
the court has repeatedly stated that, applying this standard of review, it gives
no deference to the trial court. 4 As such, from a procedural perspective, the
trial court's claim construction decisions can easily be attacked and
overturned at the appellate level.
3. PracticalProceduralIssues ofMarkman. The Markman decisions created
an administration problem for the trial courts.2"' The decisions did not
address how or when the trial court must determine the meaning of claims.

established rules of claim construction, ascertain the scope of the patentee's claimed
invention and, thus, design around the claimed invention. Allowing the public
record to be altered or changed by extrinsic evidence introduced at trial, such as
expert testimony, would make this right meaningless.
id at 1583 (citations omitted).
9 Id at 1584.
t Markman, 52 F.3d at 979.
0 138 F.3d 1448, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
201I at 1456.
22id
03 Although

the entire Federal Circuit has twice ruled that claim construction is a matter of law, the
members of the Court are dearly not unanimous in this position. See id at 1463-67 (concurring opinion
of Chief Judge Mayer, with whom Circuit Judge Pauline Newman joins).
20 See Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1354, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Vehicular Techs. v. Titan Wheel Intern., 212 F.3d 1377,1380,54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1456.
20 Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329, 332, n.3, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1235 PD. Del. 1995).
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Indeed, the Federal Circuit has held that the procedure and timing of claim
construction determinations fall within the trial court's discretion. 2°6 As a
result, district courts employ a variety of different procedures in dealing with
claim construction issues. Some courts decide claim construction in the
context of the trial, i.e., before instructing the jury. 7 Some engage in claim
interpretation in the context of summary judgment." 8 Some courts issue.
2 Many courts require
separate claim construction, or "Markman,"opinions.?
claim construction briefing which may include a Markman hearing.210 The
Northern District of California has specific rules setting forth the procedures
for claim construction briefing and a formal hearing.'
Yet, every district
(and often every individual judge) approaches claim construction differently.
Many judges continue to experiment with Markman procedures and some
express frustration over the procedural difficulties of claim construction after
Markman."2
F. PROBLEM: UNDER THE CURRENT LAW, CLAIM CONSTRUCTION IS
UNPREDICTABLE AND UNCERTAIN UNTIL THE APPELLATE DECISION

Regardless of the procedure that the trial judge employs to raise claim
construction issues, claim construction disputes are not resolved at the trial
level. Instead, on appeal, the Federal Circuit will review the trial court's
' See Vivid Techs. v. Am. Sci. & Eng'g Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (finding that the trial court acted within its discretionary authority in denying discovery with
respect to claim construction issues); Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. DePuy-Motech, Inc., 74 F.3d 1216,
1221, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1529, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
2
See, eg., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, 894 F. Supp. 819 (D. Del. 1995) (allowing no pretrial
Markman hearing, but the parties submitted proposed jury instructions on claim construction and
supporting briefs on the last day of trial. Judge McKelvie then issued an opinion which included jury
instructions on claim construction.); Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc. v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co., 894 F. Supp.
844, 850, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1069 (D. Del. 1995).
' See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., No. CIV.A. 96-434-SLR, 1999 W 1050064,
52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (D. Del. Oct. 25, 1999).
' See, e.g., Scriptgen Pharm., Inc. v. 3-Dimensional Pharm., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 409 (D. Del. 1999);
Novo Nordisk v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. CIV.A. 98-643 MMS, 1999 WL 1094213 (D.Del. Nov. 18, 1999).
211 See, e.g., EMI Group N. Am., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 157 F.3d 887, 891, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1181,
1185 (Fed. Cir. 1998); cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1112 (1999); Scriptgen Pharm., 79 F. Supp. 2d at411; Ethicon
Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 1577, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1019 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (holding a five day summary judgment/Markman hearing).
2I

N.D. CAL. CIv. Loc. RuLE 16-11.

See Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 890 F. Supp. 329, 332 n.3, 36 U.S.P.Q.d (BNA)
1235 (D. Del. 1995) ("The Court notes that Markman creates a practical problem in courtroom
administration that the Court confessedly does not know how to solve... I.
21

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol8/iss2/2

28

Bender: Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time i

CONSISTENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

2001]

claim construction under a de novo standard," 3 and without deference to the
trial court. 214 From a practical perspective, this presents a serious problem

because the Federal Circuit affirms the trial court's claim interpretation in
only approximately forty percent of cases it fully considers. Since the
Supreme Court's Markman decision on April 23, 1996, the Federal Circuit
has reviewed approximately 160 district court claim construction decisions.215
52 F.3d at 979.
Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1354, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650, 1655 (Fed. Cir.

213Markman,
214 Schering

2000); Vehicular Techs. v. Titan Wheel Int'l, Inc., 212 F.3d 1377, 1380, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841, 1843
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1456,46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1174
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc).
215 See Schering, 222 F.3d at 1347; Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222 F.3d 958, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc. v. Avia Group Int'l, Inc., 222 F.3d
951, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487 (Fed. Cir. 2000); General Surgical Innovations, Inc. v. Origin
Medsystems, Inc., Nos. 99-1382,99-1390,2000 WL 959507 (Fed. Cir. July 10, 2000) (unpublished opinion)
(non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., No. 99-1475, 2000
WL 868581 (Fed. Cir. June 29, 2000) (unpublished opinion) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule
47.6); Microchip Tech., Inc. v. Scenix Semiconductor, Inc., Nos. 99-1300,99-13012000 WL 945308 (Fed.
Cir. June 16,2000) (unpublished opinion) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Magnivision,
Inc. v. Bonneau Co., Nos. 99-1093, 99-1094, 99-1105, 99-1108, 2000 WL 772323 (Fed. Cir. June 15,2000)
(unpublished opinion) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Northern Telecom Ltd. v.
Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281,55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2000); American Imaging Servs.,
Inc. v. Intergraph Corp., No. 99-1485, 2000 WL 772725 (Fed. Cir. June 12, 2000) (non-precedential
opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Arthur S. Koenig and MDI Labs, Inc. v. Fugro-McClelland (Southwest),
Inc., Nos. 99-1252,99-1253,2000 WL 723826 (Fed. Cir.June 2,2000) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF
Rule 47.6); Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int'l, Inc., 214 F.3d 1302,54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1910 (Fed. Cir. 2000); TA Instruments, Inc. v. Perkin-Elmer Corp., No. 00-1358, 2000 WL 717094 (Fed.
Cir. June 1, 2000) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Aqua-Aerobic Sys., Inc. v. Aerators,
Inc., 211 F.3d 1241,54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics,
208 F.3d 1324,54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2000); IMS Tech., Inc. v. Haas Automation, Inc., 206
F.3d 1422, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Zodiac Pool Care, Inc. v. Hoffinger Indus., Inc.,
206 F.3d 1408, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Co., 205 F.3d
1377, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Stairmaster Sports/Medical Prods., Inc. v. Groupe
Procycle, Inc., Nos. 99-1149,99-1205 2000 WL 286066 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15,2000) (non-precedential opinion
per CTAF Rule 47.6); Cortland Line Co. v. Orvis Co., 203 F.3d 1351, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1734 (Fed.
Cir. 2000); Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Int'l Trading Co., 203 F.3d 1362, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1814 (Fed. Cir.
2000); Cellnet Data Sys., Inc. v. Itron, Inc., No. 99-1298, 2000 WL 51142 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 14, 2000) (nonprecedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); NFA Corp. v. Ashebore Elastics Corp., No. 98-1579, 2000
WL 62/7 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 5, 2000) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF rule 47.6); Vivid Techs., Inc. v.
American Science & Eng'g Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Wang Lab.,
Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 197 F.3d 1377, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Toro Co. v.
White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Manchak v.
Chemical Waste Management, Inc., No. 98-1530, 1999 WL 110364 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 6, 1999) (nonprecedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 195 F.3d 1322,
52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1590 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Abbey v. Robert Bosch GMBH, No. 99-1169, 1999 WL
819683 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 6, 1999) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Micro Chem., Inc. v.
Great Plains Chem. Co., 194 F.3d 1250,52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1258 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Elkay Mfg. Co. v.
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Ebco Mfg. Co., 192 F.3d 973, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109 (Fed. Cit. 1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 1066
(2000); K-2 Corp. v. Salomon, S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Atlas
Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Process Control
Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Star Tech.
Group, Inc. v. Testerion, Inc., No. 99-1168, 1999 WL 693829 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 7, 1999) (non-precedential
opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng'g, Inc., 189 F.3d 1370,51 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Antonious v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., No. 98-1478,1999 WL 777450 (Fed.

Cir. Aug. 31, 1999) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v.
Beckman Instruments, Inc., No. 98-1525, 1999 WL 641233 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 19, 1999) (non-precedential

opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Zelinski v. Brunswick Corp., 185 F.3d 1311, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1590
(Fed. Cir. 1999); WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int'l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); Smiths Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Vital Signs, Inc., 183 F.3d 1347, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1415
(Fed. Cir. 1999); Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Burke,
Inc. v. Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Pitney
Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Loral
Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert denied
528 U.S. 1075 (2000); Pall Corp. v. Hemasure, Inc., 181 F.3d 1305, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947 (Fed. Cir.
1999); Augustine Med., Inc. v. Gaymar Indus., Inc., 181 F.3d 1291, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1900 (Fed. Cit.
1999); Riggs Mktg. Inc. v. Mitchell, Nos. 98-1507,98-1551, 1999 WL 399710 (Fed. Cir.June 8,1999) (nonprecedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Interactive Techs., Inc. v. Pittway Corp., No. 98-1464, 1999
WL 379139 (Fed. Cir. June 1,1999) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Orlaford Ltd. v. BBC
Int'l, Ltd., No. 98-1332, 1999 WL 342224 (Fed. Cir. May 20, 1999) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF
Rule 47.6); CFMT, Inc. v. Steag Microtech, Inc., No. 98-1487, 1999 W 319505 (Fed. Cir. May 13, 1999)
(non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Karlin Tech., Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d
968, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1115 (2000); Ultrak, Inc. v. Radio Eng'g
Indus., Inc., Nos. 97-1523, 97-1543, 1999 WL 197173 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 8, 1999) (non-precedential opinion
per CTAF Rule 47.6); Signtech USA, Ltd. v. Vutek, Inc., 174 F.3d 1352, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track and Court Constr., 172 F.3d 836,50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225
(Fed. Cir. 1999); Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cit.
1999); Sextant Avionique, S.A. v. Analog Devices, Inc., 172 F.3d 817, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed.
Cir. 1999); Rival Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., Nos. 98-1198,98-1199,1999 WL 96416 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 23,1999)
(non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Berg Tech., Inc. v. Foxconn Int'l, Inc., No. 98-1324,1999
WL 96414 (Fed. Cit. Feb. 23, 1999); Voice Techs. Group, Inc. v. VMC Sys., Inc., 164 F.3d 605, 49
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Tekmax, Inc. v. Exide Corp., Nos. 97-1386, 97-1387, 1999 WL
435755 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 27, 1999) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); AFG Indus., Inc. v.
Cardinal IG Co., No. 98-1375, 1999 WL 13270 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 5, 1999) (non-precedential opinion per
CTAF Rule 47.6); Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 163 F.3d 1342, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1199 (Fed. Cit.
1998); Charleswater Prods., Inc. v. Nevamar Corp., No. 97-1402, 1998 WL 911688 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 10,
1998) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709,
48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911 (Fed. Cit. 1998); Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Co. v. Hercules Tire & Rubber
Co., 162 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1998); AptarGroup, Inc. v. Summit Packaging Sys., Inc., Nos. 97-1475, 971484, 1998 WL 791707 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 30,1998) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Alpine
Lace Brands, Inc. v. Kraft Foods, Inc., Nos. 96-1511, 97-1047, 1998 W 738600 (Fed. Cir, Oct. 22, 1998)
(non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534,48 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1998); PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 156 F.3d 1351,48 U.S.P.Q.d (BNA)
1351 (Fed. Cit. 1998); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc. 157 F.3d 1340,48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir.
1998), cert denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1999); EMI Group N. Am., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 157 F.3d 887, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Huntsman Polymers Corp., 157 F.3d
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866,48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Desper Prods., Inc. v. QSound Labs, Inc., 157 F.3d 1325,
48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1088 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Unidynamics Corp. v. Automatic Prods. Int'l, Ltd. 157 F.3d
1311,48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1099 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' per Azioni, 158 F.3d
1243,48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Mas-Hamilton Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206,
48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1010 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Strub v. Axon Corp., Nos. 97-1221, 97-1222, 1998 WL
537721 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 17, 1998); Mantech Envtl. Corp. v. Hudson Envtl. Servs., Inc., 152 F.3d 1368, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1732 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Johns Hopkins University v. CelPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Armament Sys. and Procedures, Inc. v. Monadnock Lifetime
Prods., Inc., No. 97-1174, 1998 WL 537746 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 7, 1998) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF
Rule 47.6); Pannu v. Iolab Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1657 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Ranpak
Corp. v. Storopack, Inc., No. 98-1009,1998 WL 513598 (Fed. Cir.July 15,1998); Digital Biometrics, Inc.
v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335,47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1418 (Fed. Cit. 1998); Action Techs., Inc. v. Novell
Sys., Inc., Nos. 97-1460,97-1481,1998 WL 279359 (Fed. Cir. May 27, 1998) (non-precedential opinion per
CTAF Rule 47.6); Marquip, Inc. v. Fosber Am., Inc., No. 97-1441, 1998 WL 314628 (Fed. Cir. May 19,
1998) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal
Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1752 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev'd, No. 00.1172, 2001 WL
21304,2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 233 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 8,2001); Laitram Corp. v. Morehouse Indus., Inc., 143
F.3d 1456, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Technical Chems. & Prods., Inc. v. Home
Diagnostics, Inc., Nos. 97-1068, 97-1075, 1998 WL 163650 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1998); Litton Sys., Inc. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449,46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs.,
Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1998); G & S Metal Prods. Co. v. Ekco
Housewares, Inc., Nos. 97-1188, 97-1210, 1998 WL 121472 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 17, 1998) (non-precedential
opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1498 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Stortz Instrument Co. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., No. 97-1149, 1998 WL 50947
(Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 1998); Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Phonometrics, Inc. v. N. Telecom Inc., 133 F.3d 1459,45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1421 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Brand Mgmt., Inc. v. Menard, Inc.,No. 97-1329,1998 WL 15241 (Fed. Cir.Jan. 14,
1998) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Kamyr, Inc. v. Clement, No. 97-1262, 1998 WL
15223 (Fed. Cit. Jan. 12, 1998) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Canon Computer Sys.,
Inc. v. Nu-Kote Int'l, Inc., 134 F.3d 1085,45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Bailey v. Dunkin
Donuts, Inc., No. 97-1373, 1998 WL 4726 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 8, 1998) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF
Rule 47.6); Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860,45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir.
1997);Fromson v. Anitec Printing Plates, Inc., 132 F.3d 1437,45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc., No. 97-1143,1997 WL 787052 (Fed. Cir.
Dec. 24, 1997); Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys., 132 F.3d 701,45 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1033 (Fed. Cit. 1997); Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus.,Inc., 126 F.3d 1420,44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1103 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Kegel Co. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d 1420,44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123 (Fed.
Cir. 1997); Strattec Sec. Corp. v. Gen. Auto. Specialty Co., 126 F.3d 1411, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030
(Fed. Cir. 1997); B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419,43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1896 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Wright Med. Tech., Inc. v. Osteonics Corp., 122 F.3d 1440,43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1837 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Thermalloy, Inc. v. Aavid Eng'g, Inc., 121 F.3d 691, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846 (Fed. Cit. 1997);
Endress + Hauser, Inc. v.Hawk Measurement Sys. Pty. Ltd., 122 F.3d 1040,43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1849
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Monroe Eng'g Prods., Inc. v.J.W. Winco, Inc., No. 97-1134, 1997 WL 459769 (Fed. Cit.
Aug. 13,1997); Transco Prods., Inc. v. Performance Contracting, Inc., No. 96-1336,1997 WL 459771 (Fed.
Cir. Aug. 13, 1997) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Cedarapids, Inc. v. Nordberg, Inc.,
No. 95-1529, 1997 WL 452801 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6);
Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Johansson v.
Rose Displays Ltd., No. 96-1410,1997 WL 437016 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 5,1997) (non-precedential opinion per
CTAF Rule 47.6); Oiestad v. AG-Indus. Equip. Co., No. 961478, 1997 WL 407745 (Fed. Cir. July 22,
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Of these 160 decisions, the Federal Circuit has changed the trial court's claim
1997) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
119 F.3d 1559,43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., No. 96-1399, 1997

WL 419391 (Fed. Cir. July 14, 1997) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Giora George
Angres, Ltd. v. TinnyBeauty &Figure, Inc.,No. 96-1507,1997 WL 355479 (Fed. Cir.June 26,1997) (nonprecedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., Nos. 96-1261, 96-1301,
1997 WL 357598 (Fed. Cir. June 25,1997) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Brand Mgmt.,

Inc. v. Sutherland Lumber Southwest, Inc., Nos. 96-1523, 96-1540, 1997 WL 351268 (Fed. Cir. June 25,
1997) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6);Johnstown Am. Corp. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., Nos.
97-1070, 97-1071, 1997 WL 291956 (Fed. Cir. May 28, 1997) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule
47.6); McCreary v. United States, No. 96-5110, 1997 WL 274314 (Fed. Cir. May 27, 1997) (nonprecedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114
F.3d 1547, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Target Therapeutics, Inc. v. Cordis Endovascular Sys.,
Inc., Nos. 96-1357,96-1358,1997 WL 218760 (Fed. Cir. May 2,1997) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF
Rule 47.6); CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 112 F.3d 1146, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Young Dental Mfg. Co. v.Q3 Special Prods., Inc., 112 F.3d 1137,42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1589 (Fed.
Cir. 1997); Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
Serrano v. Telular Corp., 111 F.3d 1578, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Ad-In-The-Hole,
Int'l, Inc. v. Hageman, No. 96-1455, 1997 WL 154003 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 2, 1997) (non-precedential opinion
per CTAF Rule 47.6); Trilogy Communications, Inc. v. Times Fiber Communications, Inc., 109 F.3d 739,
42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Tanabe Seiyaku Co. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n,
109 F.3d 726, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1976 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Instance v. On Serts Sys., Inc., No. 96-1112,
1997 WL 78563 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 21, 1997); J.T. Eaton & Co. v. Atl. Paste & Glue Co., 106 F.3d 1563, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Valmet Paper Mach., Inc. v. Beloit Corp., 105 F.3d 1409, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d 1619 (Fed. Cir. 1997); PSC Inc. v. ACCU-Sort Sys., Inc., No. 96-1092, 1997 WL 16033 (Fed.
Cir. Jan 17, 1997); Ekchian v. Home Depot, Inc., 104 F.3d 1299, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1364 (Fed. Cir.
1997); General Mills, Inc. v. Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 103 F.3d978,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1263 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Ohio Cellular Prods. Corp. v. Adams USA, Inc., No. 96-1173, 1996 WL 732296, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d
1538 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 23, 1996) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Cole v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Wiener v. NEC Elecs., Inc., 102 F.3d
534,41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Bradshaw v. Igloo Prods. Corp., No. 96-1199, 1996 WL
663310, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1314 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 15, 1996) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6);
Herr-Voss Corp. v. Delta Brands, Inc., No. 96-1022, 1996 WL 651688 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 8, 1996) (nonprecedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6)); Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102 F.3d 1214,40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1667 (Fed.Cir. 1996); Insituform Techs., Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 99 F.3d 1098,
40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1602 (Fed. Cir. 1996); York Prods., Inc. v. Central Tractor Farm & Family Ctr.,
99 F.3d 1568, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced
Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98 F.3d 1563,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Enforcer
Prods., Inc. v. Birdsong, No. 96-1234, 1996 WL 592161, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1958 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 16, 1996);
Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Engel
Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 96 F.3d 1398,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Ethicon EndoSurgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Great N. Corp. v. Henry Molded Prods., Inc., 94 F.3d 1569, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1997 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Great Am. Transp. Corp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d 766, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 1996);
Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492 (Fed.
Cir. 1996); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Ecolochem,
Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., No. 95-1320, 1996 WL 297601 (Fed. Cir. June 5, 1996) (non-precedential
opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6).
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interpretation in nearly 65 cases (although the final judgment itself may have
been affirmed). 1 6 Thus, on appeal, the Federal Circuit changes the claim
construction in approximately 40% of the cases.21 7 Obviously, this situation

216

See Tate Access Floors, 222 F.3d at 958, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513; CR. Bard, 2000 WL 868581;

Magnivision, 2000 WL 772323; N. Telecom, 215 F.3d at 1281, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065; Am. Imaging
Servs., 2000 WL 772725; Koenig andMDILabs, 2000 WL 723826; Elekta InstrumentS.A., 214 F.3d at 1302,
54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910; TA Instruments, 2000 WL 717094; Optical Disc, 208 F.3d at 1324, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289; IMS Tech., 206 F.3d at 1422,54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129; Toro, 199 F.3d at 1295,
53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065; Mancbak, 217 F.3d at 860; Georgia-Pacific,195 F.3d at 1322, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1590; Micro Cbem, 194 F.3d at 1250, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1258; ElkayMfg., 192 F.3d at 973, 52
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109; Process Control, 190 F.3d at 1350, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1029; Princeton
Biochems., 215 F.3d at 1349; Zelinski, 185 F.3d at 1311, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1590; WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at
1339, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385; Vital Signs, 183 F.3d at 1347, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1415;Rhine, 183
F.3d at 1342, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377; Burke, 183 F.3d at 1334, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1295; Pitney
Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1298, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161; Pall, 181 F.3d 1305, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947;
Karlin Tech., 177 F.3d at 968,50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465; RodimePLC, 174 F.3d at 1294,50 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1429; Al-Site, 174 F.3d at 1308, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161; Berg Tech., 1999 WL 96414; Voice
Tecbs. Group, 164 F.3d at 605,49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333;AFGfndus., 1999 WL 13270; Laitram, 163 F.3d
at 1342, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1199; CharlesuaterProds., 1998 WL 911688; Goodyear Tire, 162 F.3d at
1113; C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d at 1340, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225; Unidynamics, 157 F.3d at 1311, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1099; MantecbEnvtL, 152 F.3d at 1368, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1732;Ranpak, 168 F.3d
at 1316; Marquip, 1998 WL 314628; Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, 145 F.3d at 1303, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1752; TechnicalCbems., 1998 WL 163650; Litton Sys., 140F.3d at 1449, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321;
G &SMetalProds.,1998 WL 121472; StorzInstrument, 1998 WL 50947;Kamyr, 1998 WL 15223; High Tech
Med Instrumentation, 1997 WL 787052; Altek Sys., 132 F.3d at 701, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033; Strattec
Sec., 126 F.3d at 1411, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030; Wright Med Tech., 122 F.3d at 1440, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1837;Jobansson, 1997 WL 437016; Foster,1997 WL 419391; Odetics, 1997 WL 357598;Johnstown
Am., 1997 WL 291956; Target Therapeutics, 1997 WL 218760; CV/IBeta Ventures, 112 F.3d at 1146, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577;. T Eaton, 106 F.3d at 1563, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641; Valmet PaperMach.,
105 F.3d at 1409, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619; Ekcbian, 104 F.3d at 1299, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1364;
Wiener, 102 F.3d at 534, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023; Herr.Voss, 1996 WL 651688; Alpex Computer, 102
F.3d at 1214,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1667; Insituform Techs., 99 F.3d at 1098,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1602;
York Prods., 99 F.3d at 1568, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619; Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 93 F.3d at 1572, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1019; GreatAm. Tramp., 93 F.3d at 766,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801; Vitronics, 90 F.3d
at 1576,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573; see also Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track and Court Constr., 172 F.3d
836,50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cit. 1999) (finding that the trial court had an incorrect minor claim
construction, but this was harmless error); cf Arthur S. Koenig and MDI Labs, Inc. v. Fugro-McClelland
(Southwest), Inc., Nos. 99-1252, 99-1253, 2000 WL 723826 (Fed. Cir. June 2, 2000) (holding that the trial
court erred when it did not analyze the subject claim as a "means-plus-function" claim, but error was
harmless); In re McNeil-PPC, Inc., No. 99-1268, 2000 WL 426148 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 2000) (nonprecedential opinion per CTAF rule 47.6, error in claim construction by the PTO Board of Appeals and
Interferences); NFA, 2000 WL 6217 (suggesting that the trial court's claim construction was different);
AFG Indus., 1999 WL 13270 (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6) (finding that the district
court wrongly resolved or failed to resolve key claim construction issues); Finnigan,180 F.3d at 1354,51
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (finding error in claim construction by the ITC).
2'" The actual numbers of decisions noted above are somewhat of an approximation. Because of the
de novo standard of review, some of the Federal Circuit's post-Markman decisions may be unclear as to
whether the Federal Circuit actually changed the trial court's claim construction. Where it has been
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offers no certainty or predictability. If the Federal Circuit changes the claim
construction in nearly half of the cases, it is not even predictable that the
appellate court is likely to change the trial court.
The Federal Circuit's predisposition to change the trial court's claim
construction has not been lost on the practitioner. One leading patent law
firm specifically markets to corporate counsel based on the unpredictability
of the Federal Circuit. Its print ads proclaim that "[i]n Intellectual Property
Trials, Winning Isn't Everything... Unless the Appeals Court Says So ....
The trial is just one battle. The appeals court is where the war will be
decided."21 '
The cost of such uncertainty is compounded by the requirement that the
parties fully litigate the case either through trial or summary judgment
before the Federal Circuit considers the claim construction issue. The
Federal Circuit has repeatedly refused to consider claim construction issues
by interlocutory appeal.1 9 Thus, the parties must fully litigate the case in the
trial court before the Federal Circuit will even consider the claim construction determination on appeal. Yet on that appeal, there is 40% probability
that the court will change the claim construction, either remanding the case
to the trial court or, perhaps even, reversing a jury verdict. '
In short, the goals of certainty and predictability articulated by both the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit in their Markman decisions221 clearly

unclear, I have 'counted" the Federal Circuit opinion as changing the claim construction if a reversal in
the judgment resulted. In addition, some trial court decisions never actually issued a claim construction
decision. These cases have been counted as decisions considering claim construction (if the Federal Circuit
actually made a decision on the issue), but they have not been counted by the author as Federal Circuit
decisions changing claim construction if the Federal Circuit simply remanded the case for further claim
interpretation (instead of offering its own claim construction). Compare Tate Access Floors, Inc. v.
Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222 F.3d 958, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (making its own claim
construction where the trial court failed to do so (counted" as changed construction)).
"' Corporate Counsel, p. 76 (March 2000).
219 Microchip Tech., Inc. v. Scenix Semiconductor, Inc., No. 558, 559, 1998 WL 743923 (Fed. Cir.
Sept. 8, 1998) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); ArthroCare Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., No.
555, 1998 WL 568690 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 20, 1998) (non-precedential opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6); Flores
v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., NO MISC. 474, 1996 WL 673316 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 1996) (non-precedential
opinion per CTAF Rule 47.6).
a' See supra notes 215-17. One of the most unpredictable results on appeal occurred in Exxon Chem.
Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 1995). There, the
Federal Circuit not only changed the trial court's claim construction, but it also reversed a jury verdict
of infringement based on Exxon's failure of proof on the newly construed claims.
,' See supra notes 181-87.
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are not being met.2 2 The patent litigator cannot predict the trial or appellate
court's claim construction with any certainty or confidence. The patent
litigant cannot fully and accurately assess the strengths and weaknesses of its
case.

III. ANALYSIS-WHY DOES UNCERTAINTY AND UNPREDICTABILITY
EXIST IN CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

Before proposing a solution to the Markman problem, we need to
understand why uncertainty and unpredictability exist in claim construction.
As discussed more thoroughly below, the uncertainty arises from a number
of different causes. The nature of language itself allows for ambiguity. The
commercial importance of a technology often changes between the time of
the patent filing, issuance and litigation. Certainly, litigants have significant
incentives to dispute claim terms. Most importantly, the basic canons of
claim construction undermine the statutory requirements and the public
policy goals of clear claiming. Moreover, the canons are nearly impossible
to consistently apply. Finally, the Federal Circuit itself has not always
articulated or followed a consistent claim construction methodology.
A. CLAIM LANGUAGE IS OFTEN INHERENTLY AMBIGUOUS

Ideally, patent claim language would be so clear and unambiguous that
there could be no dispute as to its meaning. This ideal, however, will never
be achieved. To some extent, the nature of language and the purpose of
patent claims make absolute clarity impossible. An invention exists as a
tangible structure or a series of drawings. A verbal portrayal is usually an
afterthought written to satisfy the requirements of patent law. The
conversion of a machine or invention to words is simply too difficult. Often
the invention is novel and words do not exist to describe it."

" In addition, the purpose of the Federal Circuit itself, to create a uniformity in patent law, appears
undermined. H.R. REP. No. 97-312 at p. 20-23 (1981).
2
Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 396-97, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697 (Cl. Ct.
1967).
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As one court explained in 1868:
Inventors are not usually sufficiently skilled in the art of
nice composition, to enable them to accurately draft their
own specifications. They must, therefore, resort to others;
and it not unfrequently happens that the draftsman employed to describe a particular invention, either through
want of skill, or from haste or ignorance of the state of the
art, gives, in the specification, a very imperfect description
of the thing invented. He sometimes narrows the scope of
the inventor's ideas and combinations, and at other times
expands them over instruments and devices which are not
the product of his original thoughts. He may fail to set
forth some feature of the invention which at the time is
deemed unimportant, and, which subsequently may be
proved to be vital, or at least of great value.224
In addition to language difficulties, there is an inherent tension in claim
drafting. On one hand, the drafter attempts to fashion a claim narrow
enough that it is not invalidated by prior art." On the other hand, the
patentee wants to obtain a wide scope of patent protection, including the
coverage of future devices using the invention, some of which are entirely
unknown and unknowable. Indeed, some commentators instruct patent
practitioners to draft claims as vaguely as possible. 6 For example, one
practical treatise advises that:
The greatest possible effort should be exerted to avoid
adopting a position in which the applicant may later be
placed in a corner. It is much better technique, when
possible, not to pinpoint the essence of patentability to a
particular feature and, instead, to attempt to leave a certain

Blake v. Stafford, 3 F. Cas. 610, 612 (C.C.D. Conn. 1868) (No. 1504).
s If the patent claims covered the prior art, the description of the invention would not meet the
novelty requirement. 35 U.S.C. S 102 (1994).
u6

See ARTHUR

H. SEIDEL ET AL., WHAT THE GENERAL PRACITIONER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT

PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 65 (5th ed. 1993).
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amount of ambiguity or room to maneuver should very
pertinent prior art be subsequently unearthed . 227

Thus, the patentee and the patent drafter have practical reasons to keep the
scope and subject matter of the patent fluid and malleable.
Moreover, as the commercial significance of the technology develops and
becomes better known, the important features of the technology may
change. At the time the patent was drafted and issued, the inventor and
business predicted that one feature of the technology was significant to the
market. However, this generally can change or shift as the technology
develops commercially. Thus, in an infringement action, the patentee may
be trying to protect a technology whose commercial importance was
unknown at the time of patent drafting.
As discussed previously, the natural ambiguity of a claim can (and will)
be exploited in litigation because claim construction is so critical to the
infringement suit."' Thus, each party has a significant strategic interest in
advocating its own claim construction-and a powerful incentive to take
advantage of any ambiguity or laxity in claim drafting.
B. THE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION RULES ARE FLAWED

1. The Canons of Claim Construction. In making a claim construction
decision, the courts must sort through a variety of legal rules-rules which
are often confusing and are inherently flawed. As discussed previously, claim
construction is based primarily on the intrinsic evidence-the claim language,
the specification, and the prosecution history. 29 When construing the
meaning and scope of the patent, the court first looks to the claim
language. 30 If the claim term is unambiguous and clear on its face, the court
need not consider any other intrinsic evidence.' Where the applicability of

' See supra notes 106-09.
229 See supra

notes 192-98 (setting forth the evidence considered in claim construction determinations).
'o See supra notes 193-95; Karlin Tech. Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968, 971, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Desper Prods., Inc. v. Qsound Labs, Inc., 157 F.3d 1325, 1333,
48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1088 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (examining first the claim language).
22 Smiths Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Vital Signs, Inc., 183 F.3d 1347, 1357,51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1415
(Fed. Cir. 1999); Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2001

37

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 2

J. INTELL. PROP.L.

[Vol. 8:175

a common meaning is unclear or where more than one common meaning
could be assigned to a claim term, the court may refer to the specification
and prosecution history to discern the ordinary and accustomed meaning of
the term."'
After examining the intrinsic evidence of the patent, if the meaning of the
claim language is still ambiguous, the court may consider extrinsic
evidence." While extrinsic evidence in general and expert testimony in
particular may not be used to vary or contradict the claim language,234 when
the intrinsic evidence is insufficient to enable the court to determine the
claim meaning, extrinsic evidence "may also properly be relied on to
understand the technology and to construe the claims." 5 Finally, if after the
examination of the intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, the claim term is still
ambiguous, the court should adopt the interpretation that affords more
narrow coverage of allegedly infringing devices."
In addition to following the rules regarding the use of intrinsic and
extrinsic evidence, the courts must also give the claim terms their "ordinary
and accustomed meaning " "' and should construe the terms from the point
of view of the person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention at the
time of the invention.3 ' A court may adopt a definition different from the
term's "ordinary and accustomed meaning" in two situations. " The first
arises if the patentee has chosen to be his or her own lexicographer by clearly
setting forth an explicit definition for a claim term in the specification. 2"

2s2 Vital Signs, 183 F.3d at 1357; Renishawv, 158 F.3d at 1248; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Huntsman

Polymers Corp., 157 F.3d 866, 871,48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cit. 1998).

" Wright Med. Tech., Inc. v. Osteonics Corp., 122 F.3d 1440,1443,43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1837 (Fed.

Cir. 1997); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
2" Vitronis, 90 F.3d at 1584.
235 Id; see also Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308-09, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1161, 1167-68 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that if the patent documents, taken as a whole, are

insufficient to enable the court to construe disputed claim terms, extrinsic evidence, such as expert
testimony, may be considered). This isdifferent than considering extrinsic evidence to better understand
the technology.
' Athletic Alternatives, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

" Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985,989, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1607 (BNA)
1607, 1610 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
S"

Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473,1477,45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429,1432

(Fed. Cir. 1998).

j
Jobnson
WorldwideAssocs., 175 F.3d at 990.
Ido
.i;Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249,48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
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The second is where the claim term or terms chosen by the patentee so
deprive the claim of clarity that there is no means by which the scope of the
claim may be ascertained from the language used.24 ' In these two circumstances, the court should consider intrinsic evidence beyond the claim
language itself or in some cases, it may consider extrinsic evidence to
determine the scope of the claim language.242

2. The Ideological Flaws in the Claim Construction Canons. The claim
construction "rules" contain three main ideological flaws which preclude a
consistent and predictable approach to claim construction. First, for a court
to apply the "ordinary and accustomed meaning" to one skilled in the art,
the court must understand what the disputed term meant in the relevant
scientific community. This necessarily requires the court to consider
extrinsic evidence. A court cannot know the "ordinary and accustomed
meaning" of technical terms without consideration of extrinsic evidence. In
1942, the Supreme Court agreed: "[I]t is permissible, and often necessary, to
receive expert evidence to ascertain the meaning of a technical or scientific
term or term of art so that the court may be aided in understanding... what
[the instruments] actually say." 243 Importantly, this principle extends further
than simply educating the judge about the subject of the technology. 2 "
Instead, the Supreme Court's instruction contemplates the consideration of
extrinsic evidence, including expert testimony, about the meaning to one
skilled in the art about specific claim terms. Thus, extrinsic evidence,
including expert testimony, about the ordinary meaning of scientific claim
terms may be inherently necessary and proper (from the perspective of
developing the court's understanding of scientific terms) 245 for the court's
claim construction analysis.
The search for the ordinary meaning of scientific terms, however, creates
an impossible situation for a court. On one hand, the court needs to fully
understand the meaning of scientific terms. A "technology tutorial" alone
is probably insufficient. In most cases, a lay person, even an experienced

1117, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

,4, Johnson Worldwide Assocs., 175 F.3d at 990.
242 id
243 U.S.

Indus. Chems., Inc. v. Carbide & Carbon Chems. Corp., 315 U.S. 668, 678, 53 U.S.P.Q.

(BNA) 6, 10 (1942).
24 Comparesupra note 198 and accompanying text.
245 The author fully recognizes that consideration of such evidence may not be 'proper" from the
public policy perspective-that the public documents must notify the public of the scope ofthe invention.
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judge, is not able to fully understand the technology and to extrapolate from
that knowledge about the ordinary meaning of disputed scientific terms. Yet
on the other hand, looking to extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony,
for the ordinary meaning of claim terms defeats the clear claiming requirements and public notice function of the patent documents. Thus, the search
for the ordinary meaning of claim terms creates an inherent conflict among
the claim construction rules and basic patent principles.
Second, if the claim terms are ambiguous based on the intrinsic evidence,
looking outside the patent documents to determine meanings completely
undermines the clear claiming requirements of S 112 and the public notice
function of the claim. The patent system is based on the premise that the
public must understand the scope of the claimed invention. Section 112,
2 effectuates that policy by requiring the patentee to particularly point out
and distinctly claim the subject matter of the invention.24 The statutory
language and history plainly require the patentee, who alone controls the
claim language, to sufficiently and clearly claim the invention and to inform
the public of the scope of the claim.247 Looking to extrinsic evidence to
correct an ambiguous claim plainly defeats the public notice function of the
claim and the patent documents.
Third, if after consideration of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, the claim
terms remain ambiguous, the claim should not be saved by rules of legal
construction. The claims must function to notify the public of the scope of
the patent.24 The patentee has the added power to specifically define any
uncertain terms.249 (In any other context, if the critical language were
ambiguous, it would be construed against the drafter of the document who
alone had the power to clarify the language. 2' Thus, if after consideration
of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, the claims remain ambiguous or capable

24 35 U.S.C. S 112, 1 2 (1994).
24 See supra notes 37-100 and accompanying text.
248 See

supra notes 34-36, 82-100 and accompanying text.

24 See supra note 240 (indicating that a patentee may act as a lexicographer).

See 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts S 348 (1991). It is fundamental that doubtful language in a contract
should be interpreted most strongly against the party that selected the language. In case of doubt or
ambiguity, a contract will be construed most strongly against the party who drew it or prepared it or
whose attorney drew it or prepared it. As a corollary, a contract drawn by one party must be construed,
if its meaning is doubtful, in favor of the nondrafting party. See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts
S 206 (1981) ("In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof,
that meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from
whom a writing otherwise proceeds.").
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of multiple meanings, the claims do not adequately inform the public of the
metes and bounds of the patent. By definition, the claim has failed to meet
the requirements of S 112, 2.
C. THE CANONS DO NOT ARTICULATE, AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT DOES
NOT FOLLOW, A CONSISTENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION METHODOLOGY

Judicial attempts to apply the claim construction canons, at both the trial
and appellate levels, expose the limitations of such rules. No burden of
proof frames the issue and helps the court in its analysis. The canons alone
do not sufficiently set forth an exact procedure of analysis that a court must
(or should) follow."' The canons are simply a set of general rules. They are
not a methodology. Although the Vitronics court attempted to set forth a
methodology of claim construction,... it did not offer an approach for
determining the ordinary meaning of a term. A sampling of Federal Circuit
cases quickly demonstrates that even the Federal Circuit does not follow a
consistent claim construction methodology. This confusion presents a real,
practical problem for the trial court and for the practitioner who not only
needs to advocate as effectively as possible, but who also needs to advise the
client on the likely outcome of a Markman hearing.
For example, the parties often simultaneously file Markman briefs, in
which each party advocates proposed claim constructions. What should the
judge do when faced with the conflicting definitions? How should the judge
analyze the proposed definitions in light of the claim construction canons?
Obviously, the court should first look at the claims. But when (and how)
should the court determine the ordinary meaning of the claim terms? In
some cases, the Federal Circuit specifically determines the plain meaning of
the claim terms, although it may derive the term meaning from a number of
different sources, including extrinsic evidence. s3 In other cases, the Federal
" Indeed, the Federal Circuit has cautioned against absolute application of claim construction rules.
Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa' Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243,1248 n.2, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1117,1120
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
" See supra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
23 See Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347,1353,55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cit. 2000)
(considering expert testimony about state of the art); Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222
F.3d 958, 965, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Webster's New World Dictionary for
the ordinary meaning of a disputed term); Zelinski v. Brunswick Corp., 185 F.3d 1311, 1315-16, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1590 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (increasing the ordinary meaning of'located between,* the court
concluded that the term was not defined by the claim or the written description. Likewise, the
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Circuit simply assumes the "ordinary and accustomed meaning" of disputed
terms, without any indication of what that meaning is or how it should be
derived.2" Sometimes, the court does not even discuss the ordinary and
accustomed meaning of terms."'
Another question is when in the claim construction process should the
court look to intrinsic evidence other than the claim itself. In Vitronics, the
Federal Circuit instructed that "it is always necessary to review the
specification to determine whether the inventor has used any terms in a
manner inconsistent with their ordinary meaning."25 6 Claims must be read
in view of the specification." 7 "[T]he specification is always highly
relevant."5 ' "Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the
meaning of a disputed term."5 9
The Federal Circuit appears to have taken a somewhat different view of
claim language in RenishawPLCv.MarpossSoicieta'perAzioni.2 ° There, the
court proclaimed that "a claim must explicitly recite a term in need of
definition before a definition may enter the claim from the written
description."2 61 "Without any claim term that is susceptible of clarification
by the written description, there is no legitimate way to narrow the property
right. "262 Significantly, in both cases, the court assumed that a trial court
somehow can understand and know the ordinary meaning of the disputed
claim term solely by reference to the claims.

prosecution history did not aid the court. Thus, to construe the term by the ordinary meaning to one
skilled in the art, the court looked atthe written description.); Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim
Corp., 190 F.3d 1350,1356,52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (looking only at the claim for the
meaning of the disputed term); Antonious v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., No. 98-1478, 1999 WL 777450, *3
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 31, 1999) (non-precedential opinion by CTAF Rule 47.6) (looking to the dictionary
definition for the plain meaning of various non-scientific terms, [without comment about the use of
extrinsic evidence) but looked to the claim for meaning of the term "rear wall*).
' See, eg., Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng'g, Inc., 189 F.3d 1370, 1375,51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1948 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that itwas not dear whether the claim was to be read a certain way "even
using the ordinary and accustomed meaning of the disputed terms," yet without comment as to what the
"ordinary and accustomed meaning" of the terms was or how it was derived).
255 See, e.g.,
Process Control, 190 F.3d at 1356, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Vitronics
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
' Vitronics, 90 F.3d. at 1582.
257 iL

258Id

2" id

' 158 F.3d 1243, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1117 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
" Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1248.
262 Id
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The Federal Circuit's lack of a consistent claim construction methodology becomes most apparent when trying to determine when extrinsic
evidence, particularly dictionaries and treatises, may be considered. The
Federal Circuit does not appear to consistently follow the rule that extrinsic
evidence may only be considered for construction (versus scientific
background) issues when the intrinsic evidence is inconclusive. In many
cases, the Federal Circuit determines the plain and ordinary meaning of the
claim terms by relying on extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries and even
te cases, the court ignores extrinsic evidence
expert testimony. 263 In.1 other
about the ordinary meaning of claim terms.26
In sum, not only are the claim construction canons ideologically flawed
(and impossible to apply), but also the Federal Circuit does not approach
claim construction consistently. Under the circumstances, uncertainty and
unpredictability in patent cases will undoubtedly continue.
IV. SOLUTION: A PROPOSED CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
METHODOLOGY

If the basic claim construction rules are flawed because they are confusing
and even contradictory and if the Federal Circuit does not approach claim

'" SeeSchering Corp. v. Amgen Inc.,222 F.3d 1347,1353,55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650 (Fed. Cir.2000)
(considering expert testimony about the state of the art); Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Maxcess Techs., Inc.
222 F.3d 958, 965, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Webster's New World Dictionary
for the ordinary meaning of a disputed term); Elekta Instrument, S.A., v. O.U.R. Scientific Int'l, Inc., 214
F.3d 1302, 1307, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1910 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing dictionary for the ordinary meaning
of the disputed term); Cortland Line Co. v. Orvis Co., 203 F.3d 1351, 1356, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1734
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (using dictionary); Karlin Tech., Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968, 971, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (using dictionary);Desper Prods., Inc. v. QSound Labs, Inc., 157
F.3d 1325,1333, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1088 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (using dictionary); Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc.,
86 F.3d 1098,1105,39 ULS.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (relying on atreatise on the art and science
of footwear manufacturing without any comment on the propriety of extrinsic evidence); cf Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Huntsman Polymers Corp., 157 F.3d 866, 871, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(considering an expert affidavit stating that the meaning of the term was disputed by those skilled in the
art at the time of the patent application); Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716 48
U.S.P.Q.2d 1911 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (relying on expert testimony on an ultimate claim construction question
in cases in which the intrinsic evidence does not answer the question by trial court is correct).
See, eg., Alpine Lace Brands, Inc. v. Kraft Foods, Inc., Nos. 96-1511, 97-1047, 1998 WL 738600
(Fed. Cir. Oct. 22, 1998) (non-precedential decision pursuant to CTAF Rule 47.6); EvI Group N. Am.,
Inc. v. Intel Corp., 157 F.3d 887,48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (attempting to ignore the
extensive expert testimony about the scope of the claims); Bell & Howell Document Mgmt. Prods. Co.
v. Altek Sys., 132 F.3d 701,705-06,45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1034,1037-38 (Fed. Cit. 1997) (holding that the
district court erred in relying on expert testimony to construe claim terms).
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construction consistently, the trial courts will continue to struggle (unsuccessfully) with claim construction issues. The practitioner and the litigant
will continue to be unable to accurately assess the outcome, at the trial and
appellate levels, of a critical issue in the patent lawsuit. The Federal Circuit
will continue to change claims on appeal.
A. PROPOSED CLAIM CONSTRUCTION METHODOLOGY

The author suggests that the courts use the following claim construction
methodology. As discussed below, the proposed analysis is consistent with
general claim construction canons and public policy as well as the statutory
requirements and the basic principles of the Patent Act.
First, the trial court should determine the ordinary meaning of the
disputed terms.26 The trial court is trying to understand what one skilled in
the art understood at the time of the invention.2" As discussed below,
because the court's determination of the plain and ordinary meaning of the
claim term will involve extrinsic evidence and may involve determinations
of credibility, the trial court's decision on this issue should receive deference
from the reviewing court.26 The decision about the ordinary meaning of
claim terms should be based on the claim language itself and limited extrinsic
evidence. The court should allow and consider dictionary definitions
(particularly scientific dictionaries) and treatises at the time of patent
issuance. This extrinsic evidence should be given great weight. Such
evidence is the best method of determining the plain meaning of the terms
at the time of the invention. As objective material created at the time of the
patent application or issuance, such evidence is highly reliable. In addition,
while such materials were not actually included in the patent documents,
they were part of the scientific knowledge at the time the patent issued. As
such, unless the proffered extrinsic evidence is unreliable for some unique
reason, evidence of the public scientific knowledge at the time of the patent,

" Under any analytical framework, the parties need to determine what terms are in dispute and what
meaning each party advocates. The trial court could help the parties streamline the issue by requiring the
exchange of claim charts and responsive claim charts before claim construction briefing.
26 SeeMultiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473,1477,45 U.S.P.Q.2d(BNA) 1429,
1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
' In Markman, the Supreme Court seemed to consent to the expertise of the trial judge in making

such determinations. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389-90 (1996).
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as set forth in dictionaries and treatises, best represents the meaning to one
skilled in the art at the time of the invention.
With respect to expert testimony, courts should routinely allow and even
encourage the use of such testimony. However, the role of the expert should
be significantly limited. Expert testimony should be offered only to aid in
the court's understanding of the subject technology. The court should not
allow experts to proffer opinions regarding term meanings. 2 Nevertheless,
the trial court's claim construction is more likely to be correct if the court
fully understands the subject technology. Trial courts should be further
encouraged to allow such testimony.
Once the plain meaning of the disputed term is determined, the court
should next determine whether the patentee used the plain and ordinary
meaning. This decision requires the court to compare the ordinary meaning
of the terms to the claim. The court must presume that the patentee meant
to use the ordinary meaning of the disputed terms." This presumption can
be easily overcome if the patentee has acted as his own lexicographer.Y If
the intrinsic evidence, in particular the claims and the specification, would
not lead one reasonably skilled in the art to ascribe an unaccustomed
meaning to the claim, then the court will apply the ordinary and accustomed
meaning. If the intrinsic evidence is unclear as to whether the patentee
meant to use the ordinary meaning, the terms will be given their ordinary
meaning.
If, however, the court concludes, on the basis of the intrinsic evidence,
that the patentee did not intend to use the ordinary and plain meaning of the
disputed term, then the court must next determine what the patentee meant
by the disputed term. The patentee should offer a proposed construction.
The court must determine whether the claims, specification and prosecution
history support the patentee's alternative construction. If the intrinsic
evidence supports the construction, then that interpretation will be adopted.
If, however, the intrinsic evidence does not support the patentee's proposed
construction, the court may not look to the extrinsic evidence. Instead, the
While the author deeply respects the knowledge, expertise and ethics of experts and scientists, the
suggestion that experts hired by the parties will agree on the meaning of key terms, even scientific terms,
iscontrary to the experience of all trial attorneys.
20 See Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1607 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
27 See Multiform Desiccants, 133 F.3d at 1477 (recognizing that "the inventor may have imported a
special meaning to a term. . . to convey a... nuance relevant to the particular invention.").
ZU
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patent should be declared invalid for its failure to distinctly point out and
claim the invention.7 1
B. ADVANTAGES TO THE PROPOSED METHODOLOGY

Of course, the most obvious advantage to the proposed solution is that
it clearly provides a claim construction methodology. To that extent, even
if the methodology itself is objectionable, claim construction will at least
become predictable. Nevertheless, there are other reasons to adopt the
proposed methodology.
The proposed analytical structure better follows the general principle that
claim terms be given their ordinary and accustomed meaning. The
methodology begins with and rests on this basic principle. If the patentee
intended to offer an alternative meaning, it must be clear from the public
record. Importantly, the patentee does not lose the ability to act as a
lexicographer. Where this has occurred, the patentee simply must put the
public (and the scientific community) on clear notice through the public
records that the patent terms deviate from the ordinary meanings. The
alternative definitions must be clear from the public documents. Thus,
under this methodology, the public should have a better understanding of
the scope of the patent. Terms are either given their ordinary meaning or
an alternative meaning that is clear from the public record.
In addition, the proposed methodology encourages the trial court to
better understand the subject technology by requiring consideration of
limited extrinsic evidence and by encouraging the consideration of expert
testimony.272 To properly interpret the claims, the trial court must fully
understand the science and technology that is at issue. Indeed, this better
understanding is an advantage of a bench trial where a judge can hear all of
the witnesses and can make claim construction decisions with significant
knowledge about the technology. With the demise of the patent bench trial,
trial courts need to improve their understanding of the relevant technology.
Claim construction briefing and a short oral argument rarely allow a lay
person, nor even a sophisticated judge, to adequately understand the

" The author fully appreciates that this portion of the proposal seems extreme and possibly
draconian. The rationale for this position is more fully discussed below.
7 It is also important that the trial court receive deference on issues of credibility. The trial court
is in a much better position than the appellate court to evaluate expert witnesses.
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technology upon which a key case decision rests. This is particularly true
with some of the complex technologies that courts face today. In most every
case, the trial court should consider expert testimony pertaining to the
subject technology. The court's consideration of differing definitions and
scientific treatises should also provide the litigants with a known universe
from which they can more easily predict claim construction rulings.
The most controversial aspect of the proposed methodology is the
possibility that the patent will be held invalid if the public documents
indicate that the patentee intended to deviate from the ordinary meaning,
but do not support the patentee's proffered construction. This proposal,
however, is consistent with the history, purpose and language of the patent
statute.'7 3 If the public documents do not support the patentee's alternative
claim definitions, then the patent was not clearly drafted and did not
adequately put the public on notice as to the scope of the claim. The scope
of the patent cannot be unknown to the public.
As a practical matter, the possibility of an invalidity finding is extremely
remote. The court must first conclude that the patentee intended to use an
unusual term meaning. The potential ambiguity of this term is controlled
solely by the patentee. The patentee, and not the public, has the ability to
make the terms and the patent scope clear. Thus, under the proposed
methodology, the patentee has the incentive to clearly define unusual terms
in the patent. In addition, the patentee has the ability (and the incentive) not
to overreach with the disputed language in the context of an infringement
action. Because the potential consequences under the proposed methodology
are so dire, even overly zealous advocates will not ask the court to adopt a
construction contrary to the public documents. In short, the patentee has
more incentive to clearly define terms when deviating from an ordinary term
meaning and has the added incentive in litigation to advocate term meanings
plainly covered by the public record.
V. CONCLUSION

Given the confusion expressed by the trial courts about claim construction procedures and the extremely high percentage of changes to claim

2

In many respects, the proposal is also consistent with an invalidity determination based on

indefiniteness. The similarities between an indefiniteness evaluation and claims construction are readily
apparent. See, ag., supra notes 84-100 and accompanying text.
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construction language by the Federal Circuit, claim construction is not
consistent or predictable at either the trial or the appellate level. Clearly, we
have a problem that needs a solution. At a minimum, the consistent use by
all courts of a specific claim construction approach will correct the current
problems of uncertainty. The specific methodology proposed by the author
attempts to return to the basic tenets of patent law. The patent document
must notify the public of the boundaries of the claimed invention. Claim
terms will be given their ordinary meanings to those skilled in the art of the
invention. If the patent, which language is controlled by the patentee, and
the public record fail to adequately inform the public of the deviation from
the ordinary meaning of terms, the patent has failed to notify the public of
its metes and bounds: The inventor has no monopoly and the invention falls
into the public domain. The inventor can avoid this result by simply using
the ordinary meanings of the terms or by making the use and meanings of
extraordinary terms clear from the public documents.
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